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i. PROLOGUE
[W]e can say readily enough what a 'crime' is: It is not simply anything which a
legislature chooses to call a 'crime.' It is not simply anti-social conduct which
public officers are given a responsibility to suppress. It is not simply any
conduct to which a legislature chooses to attach a 'criminal' penalty. It is
conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place. will incur a formal and
solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.
1
1. Henry M. Hart, Jr.. The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 401, 405 (1958).
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Before launching into a detailed discussion on the question at stake-
the meaning of wrongdoing-I shall first clarify, in a nutshell, the
perplexing grounds on which this Article stands, thus outlining the legal
problems I seek to engage in debate on, as well as providing a roadmap
of the thesis I seek to articulate henceforth. I shall elaborate on this
roadmap, addressing in depth each of the issues to be raised in this Part.
Underlying this Article is my assertion that in any constitutional
democracy, for the legislature to validly classify conduct as a crime, the
fundamental principles of criminal law theory-by which I mean the
core principles of substantive criminal law on which every scholar of
criminal law agrees, regardless the theory of criminal law he adheres
to-must be met.
In addition, the argument will be made that courts of such regimes
should be empowered to strike down criminal laws when they fail the
following tests: (1) whether the particular criminal prohibition befits the
values of constitutional democracy, (2) whether the prohibition serves
a proper purpose, and (3) whether the criminalization is proportionate.
Debating the question on the constitutionality of the criminal prohibition
against flag desecration, I argue that applying the principles set forth
above shows that flag desecration cannot constitutionally be made a
crime. Considering the question in the manner set out above is superior
to the approach of the Supreme Court in United States v. Eichman for
two reasons: (1) the question whether conduct can be made a crime is
logically prior to the question whether commission of that crime is under
certain circumstances protected as free speech, and (2) the Eichman
decision itself fails to address the case of a person who physically
destroys a flag without intending to communicate any message.
Conceptually and comparatively speaking, some constitutional
democracies actually permit their courts to constitutionally scrutinize
their criminal laws in the manner set out above. However, this is not
the case in the United States, arguably because of: (1) the lack of
constitutional text authorizing such scrutiny, and (2) the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. In response to both reasons asserted, I argue
the Due Process Clause and the reference to the concepts of "Crime" and
"Criminal Prosecution" in the Sixth Amendment, could serve as a
conceptual hook for locating clear language of substantive criminal law
in the U.S. Constitution. In addition, I show how in other comparative
jurisdictions, namely Canada, the Supreme Court has extended constitutional
scrutiny over substantive criminal law even in the absence of a clear
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language of substantive criminal law in the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. As for the arguable counter-majoritarian difficulty, I contend
that legislatures cannot be relied on to protect those who are suspected of
criminal activity or those who have been found guilty of such activity,
for it is the legislature's incentive to over-criminalize.
Focusing the discussion on the criminal prohibition against flag
desecration as such, I argue that such prohibition does not meet the
fundamental principles of criminal theory for several reasons. First, the
asserted "social protected interest" by such criminalization, as argued in
Eichman, is preserving "national unity." The conduct of flag desecration
does not constitute any serious threat to society, and does not even come
close to any of the immoral conducts that might be regulated by criminal
means; those which shock the man's mind; for an immoral conduct to
become a crime there must be an intrinsic common quality by which to
distinguish criminal from non-criminal. Second, fundamental principles
of criminal law require clarity, certainty, and stability of criminal norms;
this is also a notion of the Due Process Clause understood to require fair
and just warning. In addition, respect towards others or towards ideas is
not what criminal law seeks to achieve; criminal law by nature is a
reactive system, it is not the law of "shall do," but the law of "shall not
do." The criminal nature of flag desecration is surrounded by many
doubts, which leads one to view such criminalization as treating the
human being as an object, as well as a means of doubtful national unity.
And, third because of its coercive nature, the criminal law must not be
invoked except as a last resort, especially when less coercive means are
available. I argue that the market-place of ideas is the most appropriate
means of preserving national unity.
However, assuming that one may come up with an argument in which
the prohibition against flag desecration meets the fundamental principles
of criminal law, then, it is my view that such criminalization is not
constitutional. Again, assuming that "preserving the physical integrity
of the flag as such," as means of preserving national unity, befits the
values of a constitutional democracy and it is even a proper purpose
constitutional democracy may seek to achieve, I argue that preserving
this purpose cannot be constitutionally justified if it limits constitutional
rights, e.g., free speech and the right to liberty, in a disproportionate
manner; and this is the case for the prohibition against flag desecration,
for it does not meet the three sub-tests of the proportionality requirement.
(1) Because of the coercive nature of criminal law, as well as the high
constitutional protection that both the right to liberty and free expression
(especially symbolic speech) enjoy, the government must explain the
suggestion that criminal prohibition would guarantee a stop to
desecration of the flag, and moreover, grant the flag special respect.
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I doubt any reasonable ground for expecting the criminalization of flag
desecration to be effective in achieving its objective of preserving
"national unity." (2) Educational or administrative means are less intrusive
means of achieving the asserted purpose of preserving national unity.
And, (3) on the one hand, criminal punishment has a draconian and
harsh nature; on the other hand, the damage that results from desecrating
the flag is small. The cost of such criminalization exceeds the benefits
gained from achieving the objective. The damage caused to the person
upon such criminal prohibition outweighs the damage that may occur in
the absence of such prohibition, and therefore such crime, being
disproportionate, may not be constitutional.
Before I shortly elaborate on the issue of constitutionalizing substantive
criminal law-thereby paving a smoother path toward addressing the
constitutionality of the criminal prohibition against flag desecration-I
shall first explain a final matter of methodology as to the kind of
scrutiny that my thesis is calling for.
This Article calls for two successive forms of scrutiny by the court. In
the first level of scrutiny, the court should engage in examining the
compatibility of the criminalization with the fundamental principles of
criminal law. These fundamental principles, as I shall later show, are
constitutionally required-as part of e.g., the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause-and therefore, the court has the judicial
power to engage in this kind of scrutiny. If the criminalization meets the
set of fundamental principles that criminal law suggests, then the court
should examine the constitutionality of this criminalization, in accordance
with the constitutional rules I have set out above.
These are two separate kinds of scrutiny, and the court should employ
both. The distinction between these levels of scrutiny lies in the different
set of values each affords. While criminal law theory is concerned with
preventing certain violations against the rights of others as individuals,
the rights public as a society, and other important public interests, and
thereby seeks to protect these rights and interests by limiting the
individual's right to act as they freely wish, constitutional law theory
provides the kind of balancing apparatus that criminal law is not
concerned with. Constitutional law theory debates the individual's rights
and their scope, as well as their right to exercise their liberty by peaceful
means within the community, thus seeking to balance them against the
rights of others to live in the community in peace.
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To conclude on this issue, the rights of others, as individuals and as a
whole, are formulated as the social protected interest that criminal law
seeks to protect through criminal means, and it is with these rights that
criminal law theory should be concerned in the first level of scrutiny.
However, in the second level of scrutiny, an additional set of rights are
brought into play; these are the rights of the individual, namely the actor,
to exercise their constitutional rights-e.g., free speech, liberty, free
exercise of religion. The second level of scrutiny requires balancing
those rights with the rights of others.
II. CONSTITUTIONALIZING SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW:
A PALACE OF JUSTICE
Legal theory of criminal justice distinguishes between criminal law of
procedure and substantive criminal law. While substantive criminal law
is about the definition of crime and its prescribed punishment, the law of
criminal procedure is the set of rules concerning the enforcement of
2substantive laws by the state. As ends but not means, human beings,
including criminals, enjoy human rights, especially the right to dignity.
Constitutional law primarily protects human rights. Criminal law is
correctly viewed as a draconian apparatus for limiting human rights.
Criminalizing any act requires justification, for it is the basic premise
that the individual is free to act in whatever manner he wishes unless a
particular type of conduct is explicitly prohibited. This justification can
be found in constitutional law, for constitutional law not only offers
protection to human rights, but it primarily delineates the ambit of rights,
thus striking an appropriate balance between rights and other important
social interests. In principle, the legislature strikes this balance upon the
enactment of any statute that limits human rights, primarily criminal
laws. However, where the legislature does not strike such a balance, or
where it strikes a disproportionate balance, it is for the judiciary to
intervene in accordance with its power of judicial review.
In American jurisprudence, the law of criminal procedure has always
been viewed as an inherent part of constitutional law,4 and thus has
constantly been subject to constitutional scrutiny. 5 Unlike other western
legal jurisdictions, e.g., Canada and Germany, in the American context,
2. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998).
3. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1997).
5. For instance the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment,
and the Eighth Amendment.
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constitutionalizing substantive criminal law has been a saga of hesitation.6
Several scholars of criminal jurisprudence, led by George Fletcher,7
Henry Hart,8 Daniel Suleiman, 9 William Stuntz,' 0 Joshua Dressler and
Kent Greenawalt, have addressed this issue.'' I too have inquired into
this discussion in depth.'2 It has been said that the U.S. Supreme Court
"is not likely ever to tangle" with substantive criminal law.' 3 Underlying
this criticism is the question: "[w]hat sense does it make to insist upon
procedural safeguards in criminal prosecutions if anything whatever can
be made a crime in the first place?"
'4
The argument in American jurisprudence has been that the Constitution
of 1787, including the Bill of Rights of 1791, provides no language of
substantive criminal law; but rather spells out an array of constitutional
safeguards for the law of criminal procedure,' 5 and therefore no constitutional
scrutiny may be extended over substantive criminal law. In fact, the
only substantive issues to have received constitutional treatment are
treason 16 and capital punishment.'
6. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
7. George P. Fletcher. The Meaning of Innocence. 48 U. TORONTO L.J. 157, 159
(1998).
8. Hart. supra note 1.
9. Daniel Suleiman, Note, The Capital Punishment Exception: A Case for
Constitutionalizing the Substantive Criminal Law. 104 COLuM. L. REV. 426 (2004).
10. Stuntz, supra note 4.
11. Joshua Dressler, Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Responsibility, and the Supreme
Court: How a Moderate Scholar Can Appear Immoderate Thirty Years Later, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1507, 1532 (1999).
12. See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Meaning of Guilt: Rethinking Apprendi,
33 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 501 (2007). See also Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
13. Fletcher, supra note 7, at 159.
14. Hart, supra note 1, at 431.
15. See supra note 5.
16. U.S. CONST. art. lIl, § 3, cl. I ("Treason against the United States, shall consist
only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.").
17. That is, the harshest sentences have to be reserved for the worst crimes. Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976): Furman v. Georgia. 408 U.S. 238 (1972): Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN
HISTORY 232 34 (2002): Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz. Declaring the
Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970); Herbert L. Packer,
Making the Punishment Fit the Crime, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (1964); Suleiman,
supra note 9.
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In another place, I have previously strongly rejected this kind of
explanation, proposing accordingly that the Constitution includes an
explicit language of substantive criminal law, for it is clear that when the
Constitution speaks of "Crime" and "Criminal Prosecution," in the Sixth
Amendment, it refers to the fundamental terminology of substantive
criminal law. My view has been that the Court constantly neglects to
inquire into the meaning of this obvious language of substantive
criminal law.18 This reluctance begs the question, why?, which I shall
answer by considering three oft-cited cases in this context.
In Lambert v. California,19 the Court declared the unconstitutionality,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, of a
California law that made it a crime for convicted felons not to register
with the police. Acknowledging that substantive criminal law can
violate the Constitution, the Court held in the absence of knowledge of a
duty imposed by the law, it is an infringement of due process to criminalize
such an omission to fulfill a duty.
2
0 Later, in Robinson v. California,
21
the Court held that status offenses are unconstitutional by reason of their
incompatibility with the Due Process Clause. However, realizing the
perplexing meaning of status offenses, a few years later in Powell v.
22Texas, the Court rejected the argument that public intoxication is a status
crime, thus referring to "minimally acceptable criteria of criminal
responsibi lity."
23
The Court's reaction in Powell to the Robinson decision may
faithfully explain the reason for the Court's reluctance to tangle with
18. Wattad, supra note 12, at 526-30.
19. 355 U.S. 225 (1957). The Los Angeles. Cal., Municipal Code § 52.39 required
registration with the chief of police for convicted felons. The defendant had no actual
knowledge of her duty to register. The Court held that in the circumstances where no
showing was made of the probability of such knowledge, applying the ordinance on the
defendant was a violation of her right to due process of the law under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
20. Id. at 226 30.
21. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The Court struck down a California statute that was
supposedly being imposed for actions and not for status. The Court held that the Due
Process Clause requires at minimum that punishment be imposed for actions and not for
status. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Cal. Health Safety Code § 11721, which
made the status of being addicted to the use of narcotics a criminal offense, was
unconstitutional.
22. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). See also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977);
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville. 405 U.S.
156 (1972) (at stake was an excessively vague statute, as an instance of cases that the
Supreme Court, though incoherently, has committed itself to assessing. from time to
time, the constitutionality of criminal statutes); KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DEcIDING APPEALS 35 45 (1960); Fletcher. supra note 7, at 158: George P.
Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion
Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968).
23. See Fletcher, supra note 7, at 158.
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substantive criminal law. Eventually, what the Justices viewed as
constitutional scrutiny of the substantive criminal law was regarded as
an incompetent attempt, or a risky experience to be avoided. Obviously,
the first step towards constitutionally scrutinizing substantive criminal
law, in Robinson, opened a vast door to constitutional scrutiny of every
state's substantive criminal law; a task that the Court-I can only
assume-was unwilling to take. Whether this is true or not, it is my
opinion that justice must be done, even at the cost of scrutinizing every
state substantive criminal law.
In his well-articulated essay, Suleiman suggests several reasons for
constitutionalizing substantive criminal law.24 First, the Court has the
authority to constitutionally scrutinize substantive criminal law, for this
25has been done in cases of capital punishment, as well as in other cases
where the Court has struck down state substantive criminal laws for their
contradiction of fundamental principles.26 Second, because of the nature
of political processes, judges "are the best-positioned institutional actors
to respond to injustice in the criminal law," since it is less likely that the
legislators will be in favor of repealing criminal statutes.2  And third,
federalism does not imply that every jurisdictional variation is constitutional.28
As correctly stated by Suleiman: "for the same reason the Court began
regulating the substance of capital punishment in America-a concern
for justice-it ought to establish minimum standards of criminal
blameworthiness and proportionality. 2 9
To conclude on this point, comparative studies shed light on the importance
of constitutionalizing substantive criminal law, as well as provide
counterarguments to the American reasoning behind the absence of the
language of substantive criminal law in the Constitution. Furthermore,
comparative studies elaborate on the meaning of justice that Suleiman is
concerned with.
Relying on several cognate concepts of human dignity, article 7 of the
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 embodies, in general
terms, the principle that only the Law can define a crime and prescribe a
24. Suleiman. supra note 9. at 453.
25. See supra note 17.
26. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965): Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113
(1973).
27. Suleiman. supra note 9, at 454. See William J. Stuntz. The Pathological
Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505, 529-33 (2001).
28. Suleiman. supra note 9. at 456 57.
29. Id. at 458.
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penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege).30  Legal philosophy
31distinguishes between two theories of law. One term is "law," which
expresses the idea of laws enacted by an authoritative body. The other
term is "Law," which refers to the good and just law, which is binding
because it is good and just.32 Article 7 of the Convention refers to Recht
in German, droit in French, and derecho in Spanish, namely "Law," but
not to "law" (Gesetz in German, loi in French, and ley in Spanish).33
In the same manner,34 in accordance with section 7 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms of 1982, the Supreme Court of Canada has
constitutionally scrutinized provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code of
1985 for their compatibility with "principles of fundamental justice. 35
The Court has rejected the argument that the Charter does not embrace
anything beyond procedural safeguards,36 reasoning that the task of the
Court is not to choose between substantive or procedural content per se,
but to secure for persons the full benefit of the Charter's protection
37
while avoiding adjudication of the merits of public policy. 38
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz,
GG) of 1949 demonstrates high sensitivity to the inviolable right to
dignity (Wfirde)39 and the right to personal freedom, 40 from which basic
principles of criminal law and constitutional law are derived. The German
Supreme Court in Constitutional Cases has expressed its position that if an
act satisfies the requirements of definition, the question arises whether
the act is wrongful. The principles for determining when conduct is
wrongful may be derived from both statutory and non-statutory law.
These principles can be derived by interpreting written norms with a
view to the purpose and context of these norms, as well as the
constitutional restraints higher principles impose on criminal law.4 1
30. Achour v. France, App. No. 67335/01, Eur. Ct. H.R., § 41 (2006) available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/; Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1993).
31. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 11-42 (1996).
32. Wattad, supra note 12, at 518 19.
33. E.K. v. Turkey, App. No. 28496/95, Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2002) available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/.
34. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. 1, § 11 (U.K.).
35. THE CHARTER'S IMPACT ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Jamie Cameron
ed., 1996); MARILYN PILON, CRIMINAL TRIAL AND PUNISHMENT: PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
UNDER THE CHARTER (rev. ed. 1993); DON STUART. CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW, 14 15
(3d. ed. 1995); DON STUART, CHARTER JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW (1991).
36. Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 (Can.) (Lamer. J.). See
Kienapple v. The Queen, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 (Can.).
37. R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295. 344 (Can.) (Dickson. J.).
38. See Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 889, 899 (Can.).
39. GRuNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 1 (F.R.G.).
40. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 2 (F.R.G.).
41. The Abortion Case of 1927, Reichsgericht [RG] [Federal Court of Justice]
Mar. 11, 1927, 61 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [RGSt] 242 (F.R.G.).
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Accordingly, the Court once held no act is criminal if the element of
wrongfulness is negated by public or private law; it is constitutionally
required that no punishment be imposed except on guilty people.
And "Justice" requires that the punishment be appropriate to the guilt
attributed to the offender.4 2
I now focus the discussion around the complex problem I purport to
answer in this article. The discussion I have launched into bears upon
one of the most fundamental problems in American jurisprudence
regarding the criminalization of flag desecration for the sake of preserving
national unity. As we shall see, constitutionalizing substantive criminal
law has a bearing on understanding the nature of criminal wrongdoing.
I1. INTRODUCTION
Is it constitutionally permissible to preserve the physical integrity of
the flag by means of criminal justice? This is the question before us.
The story usually told in the American jurisprudence is that if flag
desecration constitutes expressive conduct, then flag desecration enjoys
the protection of the First Amendment, making it unconstitutional to
criminalize it. Two premises drive the story: first, the lack of constitutional
protection to the American flag, and second, the constitutional protection
symbolic speech has received under the First Amendment.
This is the kind of pure constitutional analysis that I seek to criticize in
this Article; what sense does it make to discuss the constitutionality of a
criminal prohibition, if it may not become a crime in the first place?
This is not to suggest avoiding the constitutional discussion, but rather to
propose a combined analysis, which tangles with fundamental principles
of criminal law theory along with basic values of constitutional law.
Accordingly, the first question that ought to be answered concerns
the compatibility of a particular criminalization with the fundamental
principles of criminal theory (punishable wrong), for if this kind of
criminalization conflicts with fundamental principles of criminal law,
then, as Suleiman puts it, the Court must strike it down,43 as has been the
case in many cases.44 However, if the particular criminalization meets
42. German Border Guard Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Oct. 24, 1996, 95 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 96 (F.R.G.).
43. Suleiman, supra note 9, at 453.
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the fundamental principles of criminal theory, the question then becomes
one of constitutional law (constitutional crime). Constitutional law, at
this stage, acts as a barometer that examines the severity or proportionality
of the criminalization; for, as I explain further in Part V, not only ought
criminalization be a means of last resort, but also it must be imposed
with proportionality to the magnitude of the wrongdoing.
My proposal suggests an inquiry into the meaning of criminal wrongdoing,
as well as the possible interaction between substantive criminal law and
constitutional law. What is unique about this interaction is that although
constitutional law and criminal law operate in contradictory directions-
i.e., one protects rights and the other limits them-they both require
treating all persons, including criminals, as ends rather than means. In
the context of limiting human rights, constitutional law plays an
important role. Considering the non-absolute nature of human rights,
constitutional law strikes a balance between rights and other important
social interests. It also guarantees that criminal law be not only a system
of limiting human rights, but primarily a mechanism of human dignity,
thus treating criminals as humans in the first place. I see constitutional
law as concerned with a rights formula which consists of three divisions:
(1) the recognition of a constitutionally protected right, (2) the ambit of
the right, and (3) the limits that a state may impose on the right.45
In Plato's four dialogues on The Trial and Death of Socrates,
discussing the criminal nature of murder with Socrates, Euthyphro's
argues, "all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing
a murderer., 46 The common law of England has always distinguished
between mala in se offenses (because it is wrong as such), 47 and mala
prohibita offenses (because the law says it is wrong).48 This distinction
can be of great help in approaching the constitutional nature of criminal
law. Murder, for instance, is largely considered mala in se; killing a
person is explicitly excluded from the constitutional right to liberty.49
This is not the case for speech. There are forms of speech that have
45. AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY 82 (2006). See ANDREW
ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 2 (2d ed. 1995).
46. PLATO, THE TRIAL AND DEATH OF SOCRATES: FOUR DIALOGUES 7 (1992).
47. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 57 58
(Wayne Morrison ed., 2001) (1769) [hereinafter I BLACKSTONE]; ANDREW P. SIMESTER
& GORDON R. SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW THEORY AND DOCTRINE 3 (2002).
48. YUVAL LAVE & ELIEZAR LEDERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
20 (1981); MEIR DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS: ESSAYS ON LAW, SELF, AND
MORALITY 37 (2002).
49. CrimA 4424, 4713. 4779/98 Selgado v. The State of Israel [2002] IsrSC 56(5)
529 (Isr.) (Cohen, J.).
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no criminal characteristics per se, such as symbolic speech,50 i.e., using
symbols to convey meaningful messages. 5 1 This is not to say that words
do not harm at all; as for instance is the view of feminist theorists led by
Catharine MacKinnon, in which protecting pornography, for example, is
nothing but protection of sexual abuse under the cover of protecting
speech.52 This is rather to argue, as I shall elaborate, that words might
offend others, and that offense to others is not as serious as harm to
others unless it amounts to extreme offense, and therefore less coercive
means than criminal law must be considered to regulate offense against
others. However, attributing criminal liability to forms of speech having
no criminal characteristics per se requires strong justification, for it is the
basic principle of every legal system that the individual is free to act by
their free will, unless a particular act is expressly prohibited.
As provided in Part ii, the importance of constitutional law in the
context of crime and punishment may not be denied especially because
of the draconian nature of criminal law, where human rights are most
likely to be violated.53  Constitutional law clarifies the fuzzy borders
between acts that may be penalized and others that are subject to
different kinds of social interventions. Not every act that could be
criminalized should be; for a crime to be constitutionally justified, a
constitutional balance must be drawn. Criminal punishment is imposed
for the wrongdoing upon which a criminal has been found guilty. The
guilt requirement is the justification for imposing criminal punishment
upon the commission of a proven wrongdoing.54 Criminal law is the set
of rules that represents the right and wrong as established by social
order, relying on the general acknowledgement of the community. A
crime is the commission of wrongdoing to which a certain mental state is
attached; crime is not the wrongdoing alone. The wrongdoing factor is
the most important component of the definition of a crime, for it reflects
the concept of right and wrong as recognized by the community, i.e., a
50. CHARLES KAY OGDEN, THE MEANING OF MEANING 23 (8th ed. 1956); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969); United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Stromberg v. California. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
51. James R. Dyer, Texas v. Johnson: Symbolic Speech and Flag Desecration
Under the First Amendment, 25 NEWENG. L. REv. 895. 908 (1991).
52. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 9, 12 (1993).
53. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 7. See also The Abortion Case of 1975,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 1 (F.R.G.).
54. Wattad, supra note 12, at 529-30.
TT 1/9/2009 9:53:51 AM
WATTAD 
1 92009 9 5351 AiM
criminal offense as an anti-social phenomenon. "The wrongness of the
phenomenon lies in its anti-social harm to a legally protected interest...
[and] ... is the product of the anti-social nature of the act, and of the
anti-social nature of the result." 55 However, the wrongdoing factor is not
sufficient in itself to constitute a crime. Rather, it has to be committed
under a recognized mental state. Criminal responsibility is based on the
attribution of the commission of a crime (wrongdoing associated with
mental state) to a person. Attribution captures the idea of holding the
offender responsible for the crime.56
Inquiring into the meaning and the nature of criminal wrongdoing, I
endeavor to understand the interrelationship between the function
criminal law plays in limiting human rights, relying on the general
acknowledgement of the community, and the role constitutional law
fulfils in protecting human rights as well as striking a balance between
protected human rights and other important social interests. My view is
that understanding the meaning of human dignity, as well as its
important contribution to the meaning of criminal wrongdoing, explains
the urgent need to subject substantive criminal law to constitutional
scrutiny.
To this end, I am not suggesting analyzing the notion of crime
independently of the Constitution, but rather conjointly with both the
Constitution and the fundamental principles of criminal theory. However,
in doing so I argue for some methodological order, for it makes no
sense, for instance, to discuss the constitutionality of a particular
criminalization if this criminalization does not stand in accordance with
fundamental principles of criminal theory, namely, if it is not a crime in
the first place. The American saga of flag desecration elaborates on this
position.
The American saga of flag desecration embodies questions that
implicate an inherent interaction between fundamental principles of
criminal law and other constitutional values. In Texas v. Johnson,57 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that criminalizing desecration of the United
States flag is a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of speech.
However, in Street v. New York, the Court avoided addressing the
question of whether the act of flag burning as such is protected under the
55. KHALID GHANAYIM, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN JUSTIFICATION AND ExcuSES
IN CRIMINAL LAW. REFLECTIONS ABOUT NECESSITY, A THESIS FOR THE DEGREE DOCTOR
OF LAW 2 (Under the Supervision of Professor Mordechai Kremnitzer, 2002).
56. Wattad, supra note 12, at 534.
57. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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First Amendment as a form of symbolic speech.5 8 Later, the Flag
Protection Act of 1989, which was enacted to overturn Johnson, was
also invalidated in United States v. Eichman, for being in violation of the
right to freedom of speech. In both cases, the Court did not declare the
Flag Protection Act invalid on its face. Underlying the Court's reasoning
was the assumption that: "Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the




The Court emphasized the constitutional importance of symbolic speech,
but made no reference or allusion to criminal law theory. Thus, the
Court neglected the principal question that concerns criminalizing
certain acts. The Court restrained its analysis to the pure conventional
constitutional premises of the First Amendment. However, the fact that
a particular conduct is presumptively constitutionally protected does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that the conduct may not be
criminalized. Every person has the right to liberty and privacy, but that
does not mean people are allowed to kill others or exercise abortion as
they wish. Whereas the intentional cause of death of another person is
excluded from the right to liberty, causing another's death under
circumstances of self-defense is recognized as the exercise of the right to
liberty and personal autonomy. Before launching a detailed inquiry as to
whether a particular type of conduct is included in or excluded from a
right, one must ask the question if the discussed conduct may be
assigned as a recognized wrong. If this is the case, then the question
becomes one of punishable wrongs, which must be resolved in accordance
with the fundamental principles of criminal law theory. Only then is it
possible to challenge the constitutionality of the particular criminalization.
One could conceivably question the logic of this transition. In addition
to the answer that Part V(C) will provide, I explain now as follows.
When the Court examines the constitutionality of the prohibition
against flag desecration based on pure constitutional analysis, it is the
Court's assumption that legislators are free to make any act a crime
unless the particular criminalization violates a constitutionally protected
right. However, this is exactly what I sought to explain in Part Ii, namely
that the Court's reluctance to constitutionalize substantive criminal law
is based primarily on the assumption that legislators are free to make any
58. Michael A. Henderson, Today's Symbolic Speech Dilemma: Flag Desecration
and the Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 41 S.D. L. REv. 533, 555 (1996); Sheldon
H. Nahmod, The Sacred Flag and the FirstAmendment, 66 IND. L.J. 511. 515 (1991).
59. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990).
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act a crime in the first place. Many criminal jurisprudence scholars
largely criticize this is the kind of assumption, arguing for the subjection
of substantive criminal law to constitutional scrutiny. The basic constitutional
assumption we must acknowledge is that a person is free to do whatever
he wishes. That is, criminal law, viewed as the law of limiting rights
and freedoms, is the exception but not the rule. This constitutional
assumption begs the question then, not of the unconstitutionality of a
particular criminalization, but rather that which concerns the fundamental
principles of criminal theory. These principles are usually neglected by
legislators in the course of articulating any criminal prohibition, for they
are more likely to be driven by policy considerations than principles of
criminal theory, as correctly viewed by Suleiman, who argues that
"legislators have little incentive to repeal criminal statutes or decrease
punishments for criminal behavior, '' 60 and Stuntz, who posits that
legislators' main concern is to appease voters on issues of crime.61
However, there are cases where legislators acknowledge principles, and
not just policy considerations, to articulate a crime in complete
accordance with the fundamental principles of criminal law. In the latter
cases, all we know is that criminal theory allows for such criminalization,
but nothing should be implied as to the constitutionality of the crime, for
such criminalization might be violating human rights in a manner contradictory
to the nature of the constitutional protection that a particular right
enjoys. In these cases, constitutional analysis is urgently required to
strike balances of proportionality for instance, or to delineate the limits
of the power of criminal law in regulating human behavior within the
bounds of the constitutional protection that the right enjoys.
Driven by analytical, theoretical, and comparative methodologies, I
seek in this article to shed light upon a number of different issues and
perplexing fields. In Part IV, following a discussion on the development
of symbolic speech theory within the First Amendment, I present the
American story of flag desecration, and the Court's methodology in
approaching the question of the constitutionality of criminal prohibition
of flag desecration. In addition, I provide an analytical critique of the
Court's reasoning. However, to achieve this end, I first set out the
touchstone cases on free expression, which led to the development of the
theory of symbolic speech as a constitutionally protected right by the
First Amendment. These cases constitute the main starting point for
every discussion, by the Court, on the constitutionality of the criminal
prohibition against flag desecration. In the context of flag desecration,
addressing these cases serves to delineate the grounds of my argument,
60. Suleiman. supra note 9. at 454.
61. Stuntz, supra note 27.
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according to which the Court has constantly neglected criminal law
theory and focused instead on the classic constitutional analysis of the
First Amendment.
In Part V, I formulate a theory of criminal law, inquiring into the
meaning of criminal wrongdoing and the underlying premises of
conflicts and interrelations between constitutional law and substantive
criminal law. This inquiry relies on the bedrock principle of human
dignity, which underscores both criminal law and constitutional law,
according to which persons, including criminals, must be treated as ends
but not means, under which they are the subject of the law rather than its
object. Part V sets forth the basic pillars of criminal law theory, as well
as those of constitutionalizing substantive criminal law. Finally, in Part
VI, I focus the discussion on the prohibition against flag desecration,
arguing that flag desecration may not be criminalized according to the
fundamental principles of criminal theory, and even if it may be so
criminalized, such criminalization may not be constitutionally justified.
As provided in Part ii. and on which I elaborate in Part V, constitutionalizing
substantive criminal law requires a deeper understanding of criminal law
theory, rather than simply declaring an ad hoc crime to be unconstitutional
under conventional constitutional analysis. Constitutionalizing substantive
criminal law requires an understanding of the fundamental principles of
criminal theory in the constitutional context. It must not be done
through a dichotomy; it is not a pure story of constitutional law, nor is it
a pure discussion of substantive criminal law. Rather, it is a synthesis of
both criminal law and constitutional law.
What makes an act socially, morally, or ethically wrong may not
always make it criminally punishable. Criminal law is not only a system
of rights deprivation, it is primarily a mechanism of imputing highly
condemnatory stigmas, and therefore must be preserved for the most
serious of wrong actions (the minimal principle); those which are
characterized by high levels of immorality or serious harm or danger to
the society as a whole and the public order. Only in this way may we
protect human dignity.
IV. DE LEGE LATA: UNCONSTITUTIONAL CRIME-PURE
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Before addressing the American de lege lata regarding the question on
the constitutionality of the criminal prohibition against flag desecration,
I will first set out the basic principles of the American jurisprudence on
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free expression, as well as the development of the theory of symbolic
speech.
A. Dignifying Free Speech
Many democratic countries regard the right to freedom of expression
as a fundamental right.62 National and international courts have played
an indispensable role in protecting the right to freedom of expression
and have created a set of important principles and a body of rich
63jurisprudence aimed at enlarging the right to freedom of expression.
This is "applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. 64 However,
none of these leading democracies have regarded freedom of expression
65as absolute. In the American context, the right to freedom of
62. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec
(Attorney General). [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927. 976 (Can.); RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd..
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 584 (Can.); HCJ 73, 87/53 "Kol Ha'am" Co. Ltd. v. Minister of
Interior, [1953] IsrSC 7(2) 871, 876 78 (isr.); PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
CANADA 713 (2d ed. 1985); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1055 (6th ed. 2000).
63. WALTER BAGEHOT, THE METAPHYSICAL BASIS OF TOLERATION (1874);
FRANCIS CANAVAN, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION PURPOSE AS LIMIT (1984); ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY (1956); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN
THE UNITED STATES (1941):- HAROLD JOSEPH LASKI, LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE
(1930); HAROLD JOSEPH LASKI, AUTHORITY IN THE MODERN STATE (1919); LEONARD W.
LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960): JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION (1690); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1690); JOHN
LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1689); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859); JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGITICA (1644).
64. The Sunday Times v. The United Kingdom (No. 2), 217 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 25 (1991). Accord Vogt v. Germany, 323 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1995); Lingens
v. Austria, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1986); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1976). See also Human Rights Act. 1998. arts. 2(1), 3. 4. 8
(U.K.).
65. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 8. 1987, 75
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 108 (F.R.G.); Luth,
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1958, 7
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 198 (F.R.G.); RICHARD
MOON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 34 (2000);
Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of the
American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 305, 327 (1999);
Cyril Levitt, Under the Shadow of Weimar: What are the Lessons for the Modern
Democracies?. in UNDER THE SHADOW OF WEIMAR: DEMOCRACY, LAW, AND RACIAL
INCITEMENT IN SIX COUNTRIES (Louis Greenspan & Cyril Levitt eds., 1993). See
Volksverhetzung [Incitement to Hatred], 130 StGB, BGBI. 1 1985. § 965 (F.R.G.);
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, 1356 (Can.); Irwin
Toy Ltd.. 1 S.CR. at 970, 976 (Can.); HCJ 806/88 Universal City Studios Inc. v. Films
and Plays Censorship Board [1989] IsrSC 42(2) 22, 34-35 (Isr.).
TT 1/9/2009 9:53:51 AM
WAYFAD 
1 92009 9 5351 AiM
[VOL. 10: 5. 2008] Grounds for Preserving "National Unity"?
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
expression has been the main concern of the American Bill of Rights.66
"The First Amendment appears to speak in absolutist terms." 6' The U.S.
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment to mean that
government can rarely, and only for the most compelling reasons, invoke
its power to regulate speech.68
Three classic rationales have been recognized for protecting freedom
of expression. The first is the desire to expose the truth. Freedom of
expression must be ensured to allow for different views and ideas to
compete with each other. From this competition-and not from the
69regime's dictate of a single truth-the truth shall surface and emerge.
The second rationale is the need for human self-fulfillment.70 The
spiritual and intellectual development of man is based on his ability to
freely formulate his world views." The third rationale for protecting
freedom of expression is that it is a prerequisite for democracy. Free
voicing of opinions and the unrestricted exchange of ideas among people
is a conditio sine qua non for the existence of a political and social
regime in which the citizen can weigh, without fear, what is required, to
the best of his understanding, for the benefit and welfare of both the
public as well as the individual, and how to ensure the continued
existence of the democratic regime and the political framework in which
it operates.72
66. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
67. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62. at 1063. See also RANDALL P. BEZANSON.
SPEECH STORIES: How FREE CAN SPEECH BE? 1 (1998); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 894 (1963).
68. KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND
LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 16 (1995).
69. This rationale concerns the social interest of revealing the truth. Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951): Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616. 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J.); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May
13, 1980, 54 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 129, 139
(F.R.G.); HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Co. Ltd. v. The Film Review Board, [1997] IsrSC
55(5) 661 (isr.).
70. This rationale is concerned with the private interest of providing every man
with the security to give expression to his personal characteristics and capabilities. to
develop his ego to the fullest extent possible, and to state his mind, so life may appear to
him worthwhile. ERNEST BARKER, REFLECTIONS ON GOVERNMENT 14 19 (1942).
71. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Castells v. Spain, 236 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 21 (1992); MOON, supra note 65. 27 28.
72. This rationale concerns the political interest of protecting democracy.
Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General). [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, 1336 (Can.):
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 6, 1979, 50
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 234 (F.R.G.); Lath, Jan. 15,
1958 BVerfG, 7 BVerfGE 198; HCJ 372/84 Klopfer-Nave v. Minister of Education and
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Recent studies have considered human dignity and equality as possible
justifications for freedom of expression. The core meaning of dignity
is that social order must reflect recognition of the equal worth of all
persons.74 Dignity expresses at least the basic meaning of equality.
75
Dominantly among other scholars, Ronald Dworkin, as well as Kent
Greenawalt, 76 have argued that the government may not discriminate
between citizens by permitting some views and denying others. Equality
demands that everyone have a chance to influence, and that everyone's
opinion be given a chance for influence.77
B. Freedom of Expression & Symbolic Speech:
An American Innovation
78
No one pretends that actions should be as free as opinions.
In 1919, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. observed, in Schenck v. United
States, that the "most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. 79
Under the First Amendment, Holmes said, "the character of every act
depends upon the circumstances in which it is done."80  American
constitutional jurisprudence suggests a spectrum of expressions that
enjoy the constitutional protection of the First Amendment.8' The
Culture. [1984] IsrSC 38(3) 233. 238 (Shamgar, C.J.) (Isr.); Emerson. supra note 67, at
885-89.
73. CrimA 4463/94 Golan v. The Penitentiary Service, [1996] lsrSC 50(4) 136
(Isr.); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 195-213 (1977); Frederick
Schauer. Speaking of Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND
AMERICAN VALUES 178, 179 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent, eds., 1992). Cf
Guy E. Carmi. Dignity-The Enemy from Within: A Theoretical and Comparative Analysis of
Human Dignity as a Free Speech Justification, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 957 (2007).
74. Other meanings might be: (1) respect of physical identity and integrity, and (2)
respect of intellectual and spiritual identity and integrity.
75. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 106-07 (2001). Cf SUSANNE BAER, WORDE ODER GLEICHHEIT
216 (1995): MACKINNON. supra note 52, at 71 110.
76. KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 27-28, 33-
34 (1989): Kent Greenawalt. Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 119, 153
(1989).
77. RONALD DWORKIN. FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 78, 200 (1996); RONALD DWORKIN, supra note 73, at 200; Michael C.
Dorf, Review Essay. Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REv.
133, 160 (1997);
78. Mill. supra note 63. at 63.
79. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
80. Id.
81. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15. 24 (1973): Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964): Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE:
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classic protected expression is political speech;82 others are inter alia
commercial, 3 artistic, literary, and symbolic expressions 4 The degree
of constitutional protection differs between types of speech, depending
on the extent to which the speech is intrinsically related to the
development of the person's dignity and the fulfillment of his personal
potential. Symbolic speech is a recent development of the twentieth
century that lies in the theoretical recognition that there are types of
conduct that may convey messages, and thereby extends the protection
afforded by the First Amendment beyond written or spoken words.8 5
One can express attitudes and beliefs through countless means besides
speech in the form of speaking or writing.86  Conduct which is
communicative in nature is often only referred to as "symbolic speech"
or "expressive conduct"8' 7 if the actor deliberately attempts to communicate
a message and his action conveys that message to observers.8 8
FREEDOM, COMMUJNITY. AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1985); LESLIE STEPHEN, THE
SUPPRESSION OF POISONOUS OPINIONS (1883); PHILIPPA STRUM, WHEN THE NAZIS CAME
TO SKOKIE: FREEDOM FOR SPEECH WE HATE 36, 70. 115 (1999) Alon Harel & Gideon
Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507 (1999). See also Ford v.
Quebec (Attorney General). [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (Can.); HCJ 5432/03 SHIN, Israeli
Movement for Equal Representation of Women v. Council for Cable TV and Satellite
Broadcasting [2004] IsrSC 58 65 (Isr.) (Dorner, J.); JOSEPH ELIOT MAGNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA: CASES, NOTES AND MATERIALS 629, 672 (5th ed. 1993).
82. Schenck, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 C.L.R. 1,
112-21(Austl.); Levy v. Victoria (1997) 189 C.L.R. 579 (Austl.); 2 LASKIN'S CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1030, 1038 (Neil Finkelstein ed.. 5th ed. 1986); Douglas-Scott,
supra note 65, at 315.
83. Bigelow v. Virginia. 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Valentine v. Chrestenson, 316
U.S. 52. (1942); Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario [1990] 2 S.C.R.
232 (Can.); Ronal Rotunda, Commercial Speech and the Platonic Ideal: Libre
Expression et Libre Enterprise, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE CHARTER 320, 337
(David Schneiderman ed., 1991); Lorraine E. Weinrib, Does Money Talk? Commercial
Expression in the Canadian Constitutional Context, in FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE
CHARTER 336, 339 (David Schneiderman ed., 1991).
84. DAVID S. BOGEN, BULWARI' OF LIBERTY: THE COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
88 (1984).
85. BEZANSON. supra note 67, at 93: Melville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of
Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29, 30 (1973).
86. Ute Krfdewagen, Political Symbols in Two Constitutional Orders: The Flag
Desecration Decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the German Federal
Constitutional Court, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. LAW 679 (2002).
87. Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Loc. 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308. 313 (1967); Brown v. Louisiana. 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966); W. Va. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105
(1940); Stromberg v. California. 283 U.S. 359. 369 (1931).
88. GREENAWALT, supra note 68, at 21.
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The story of criminalizing arguably symbolic speeches in American
jurisprudence began in 1931, when the Court in Stromberg v. California
8 9
recognized for the first time that non-verbal expression may invoke the
First Amendment, holding that a conviction for displaying a red flag in
opposition to the government violated free speech principles.9s  West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnetter confirmed this principle
when the Court held that West Virginia's requirement that students in
public schools salute and pledge allegiance to the flag was unconstitutional.92
The Court explicitly recognized that saluting the flag was a form of
symbolic speech.93
As to the scope of the constitutional protection accorded to symbolic
speech, the Court in Cox v. Louisiana94 overturned the convictions of a
group of black segregation protesters who had been charged with
obstructing public passage, criminal conspiracy, disturbing the peace,
and picketing before a courthouse. Although the Court recognized the
communicative value of the protester's actions, i.e., carrying signs and
singing, including the anthem, it held their convictions violated the First
Amendment, refusing to treat non-verbal speech in an identical fashion
to "pure speech." 95 In United States v. O'Brien,96 the Court set boundaries
for the protection of expressive conduct, declaring that conduct containing
both speech and non-speech elements may properly be regulated if the
restrictions on the speech elements are merely incidental to an important
government interest in regulating the non-speech elements. 97 Moreover,
the Court held that a restriction on non-verbal expression does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech if: (1) the
restriction is within the government's constitutional powers; (2) the
purpose of the governmental action is to pursue a legitimate governmental
interest; (3) the interest asserted is unrelated to restricting expression;
and (4) the limitation that results is narrowly tailored to meet the
89. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
90. Id. at 369. California Penal Code 403(a) (1919) provided, in relevant part:
"Any person who displays a red flag, banner, or badge.., as a sign, symbol or emblem
of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchistic
action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character is guilty of a felony." Id.
at 360-61.
91. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
92. The West Virginia requirement was challenged by a number of students and
their parents. The students, who were Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to salute the flag for
religious reasons. Id. They were expelled for their failure to comply with the
requirement. Id. at 629-30.
93. Id. at 632.
94. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
95. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
96. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
97. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). The Court upheld the
conviction of anti-Vietnam activist who had publicly burned his draft card.
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governmental interest (the "O'Brien test").98 In the final case of that
period, the Court in Tinker v. Des Moines,99 struck down a school
regulation which forbade the wearing of black armbands in protest
against American involvement in Vietnam. This decision was grounded
in the premise that a restriction based upon a non-speech interest is not
justifiable in the absence of a threat of "material and substantial"
interference with the non-speech interest. 100 The Court found the threat
to non-speech interests was not sufficiently vital to warrant the restriction;
therefore, the restriction was unconstitutional. 10 1 Wearing armbands
constituted symbolic speech, and the school regulation that forbade the
action clearly failed the third part of the O'Brien test.
Having set out the ground on which the theory of symbolic speech has
evolved in the American jurisprudence, I will now focus the discussion
on the American saga of criminalizing flag desecration. I shall address
the touchstone cases, through which the U.S. Supreme Court has debated
this issue.
C. Flag, Flag, and Flag: A Story of Symbolic Speech
You might ask mockingly: 'A flag? What's that? A stick with a rag on itT
No sir, a flag is much more. With a flag you lead men, for a flag. men live and
die. In fact, it is the only thing for which they are ready to die in masses, if
you train them for it. Believe me, the politics of an entire people ... can be
manipulated only through the imponderables that float in thin air.
102
Does the flag have its own dignity, protection and meaning regardless
of the government or the policy of the state? Or, is it a rectangular piece
of cloth, which on its own lacks any meaning? Symbolism is a primitive
but effective way of communicating ideas. 103 The use of an emblem or
flag to symbolize a system, an idea, an institution or responsibility, is a
98. Id. at 377.
99. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
100. Nimmer, supra note 85, at 42-43.
101. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
102. Theodore Hertzel, the founder of modern Zionism, wrote these words to a
German friend who had questioned the significance of flags. ROBERT TUSTIN GOLDSTEIN,
SAVING "OLD GLORY": THE HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN FLAG DESECRATION CONTROVERSY
ix (1995) (omission in original).
103. Dyer, supra note 51, at 896.
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shortcut from one mind to another. 10 4 The flag has caused sagas for
many nations,1°5 notably the United States of America, where a complete
theory of symbolic speech has been developed. I will shortly discuss the
lack of a comprehensive theory of symbolic speech in comparative
jurisdictions.
The Canadian Supreme Court has not resolved a "symbolic speech"
case under the Charter, but it would only be plausible for the Court to
hold that Section 2(b) of the Charter does not apply if the accused could
show that his "activity supports rather than undermines the principles
and values upon which freedom of expression is based. 10 6 In the same
manner, the Supreme Court of Israel has not yet received a case
challenging the constitutionality of the criminal prohibition against
violations of physical integrity of the flag. 10 7 However, on the only
occasion the Israeli Court has had to express its opinion about offensive
words against the flag, Justice Mishael Chashin expressed his view, in
obiter dictum, that the flag is constitutionally protected, as it represents
the collective dignity of all people.108
The mode of expressive conduct which has garnered the most attention in
recent years has been expression utilizing the American flag.109 The U.S.
Supreme Court has decided a number of important cases, and concluded
that the use of the flag to convey particular messages may constitute
expressive conduct that enjoys the full protection of the First Amendment 10
I address these cases in order, thus paving the way toward centralizing
the discussion on the compatibility of criminal prohibition of flag desecration
with fundamental principles of criminal theory. It is my view that the
Court, sitting in these cases, adhered exclusively to conventional
constitutional analysis, thereby avoiding any tangle with substantive
criminal law as an inherent part of constitutional scrutiny.
The controversy surrounding the use of the flag as a means of
expressive conduct began in the late 1960's, when in response to the
slaying of a civil rights leader, Sidney Street burned his personally
owned flag while talking out loud to a group of people, saying "[w]e
104. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943): BEZANSON,
supra note 67, at 189; GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 143 (1993).
105. On the history and the meaning of flags, see generally I. Bennett Capers,
Flags. 48 How. L. J. 121 (2004).
106. R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 730 (Can.); See also GREENAWALT, supra
note 68, at 25.
107. Flag and Emblem Law, 5709-1949, 3 LSI 26 (1949) (Isr.); article 167 of the
Israeli Penal Act of 1977.
108. HCJ 8507/96 Urin v. The State of Israel, [1997] IsrSC 51(1) 269 7(lsr.).
109. FLETCHER. supra note 104, at 125.
110. Henderson, supra note 58, at 554.
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don't need a damn flag." '' ' The Court upheld the conviction, relying on
the peripheral Stromberg ground, 12 namely the conviction could have
been based on the defendant's contemptuous language about the flag
rather than his act of burning it. The Court thus avoided "symbolic
speech" analysis, i.e., the legitimacy of the state interest in preserving
the flag as an unalloyed symbol of the country,' 13 refusing to decide the
issue regarding the constitutionality of criminalizing the act of burning
the flag as an act of free speech. In the same vein, in Smith v.
Goguen, "14 the Court again avoided "symbolic speech" analysis, striking
down a Massachusetts flag desecration statute, which made it a criminal
offense to treat "contemptuously" the flag of the United States, relying
on the doctrine of vagueness, which requires that all criminal prohibitions
must provide fair notice to persons before making their activity criminal.' 
15
Finally, in Spence v. Washington,116 at stake was a conviction for
affixing peace symbols made from black masking tape on a personally
owned flag, in violation of a statute that makes it a crime to attach any
mark upon the flag. In a narrow holding, the Court overturned the
conviction, emphasizing the flag was privately owned, it was displayed
on private property, and there was no evidence of any risk of breach of
the peace. Notably, the Court left open the possibility that there could
be a legitimate state interest in preserving the flag as an "unalloyed
symbol of our country."
'" 7
In August 1984, Gregory Lee Johnson burned the American flag
during a Dallas protest march, while the protests chanted: "America, the
red, white and blue, we spit on you."' ' Johnson was charged with
desecration of a venerated object in violation of the Texas Penal
111. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 579 (1969).
112. Stromberg v. California. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
113. In Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940), the Court
upheld the expulsion of two children from a public school for failure to salute the flag.
Three years later, the Court repudiated Gobitis, in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette: "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein." 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
114. 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
115. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 62,
at 1070-71.
116. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
117. Spence v. Washington. 418 U.S. 405. 412 14 (1974).
118. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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Code.119 In defense, Johnson challenged the constitutionality of the
Texas statute relying on "symbolic speech" analysis. The Court first held
that Johnson's flag-burning was "conduct [']sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication' to implicate the First Amendment.""12
The Court then considered and rejected the State's argument that under
O'Brien12 1 it ought to apply the deferential standard with which the
Court had reviewed Government regulations of conduct containing both
speech and non-speech elements where "'the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. ,, 122 The Court reasoned
that the State's asserted interest in preserving the flag, as a symbol of
nationhood and national unity, was an interest related "to the
suppression of free expression" within the meaning of O'Brien, because
the State's concern with protecting the flag's symbolic meaning is
implicated "only when a person's treatment of the flag communicates
some message. 1 23 Therefore, the Court subjected the statute to "the most
exacting scrutiny, 124 concluding that the State's asserted interests could
not justify the infringement of the demonstrator's First Amendment
right. It was the Court's view that "[t]he way to preserve the flag's
special role is not to punish those who feel differently about these
matters [but] ... to persuade them that they are wrong.
1 25
Johnson was a major case. However, a revision of the federal law on
flag desecration, which arguably could withstand constitutional scrutiny,
deflected the effort to amend the Constitution. In 1989, Congress passed
the Flag Protection Act, which was designed to overcome the content
based holding of Johnson with content neutral wording, providing, in
relevant part:
(a)(]) Whoever knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically defiles, bums, maintains on
the floor or ground. or tramples, or tramples upon any flag of the United States
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both. 1
26
The idea underlying the Flag Protection Act was that the definition of
the crime is removed as far as possible from focusing on communicative
acts. In the first judicial response to the Act, the Court, in United States
119. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1989): "[a] person commits an offense if he
intentionally or knowingly desecrates ... [a] national flag," where "desecrate" meant to
"deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action."
120. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (citation omitted).
121. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
122. Johnson, 491 U.S. 407.
123. Id. at 410.
124. Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
125. Id. at 419: see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357. 377 (1927).
126. 18 U.S.C.A. § 700 (Supp. 1990).
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v. Eichman, considered whether the conviction for violating the Flag
Protection Act is consistent with the First Amendment.'12 The Government
contended that the Flag Protection Act is constitutional because, unlike
the statute addressed in Johnson, the Act does not target expressive
conduct on the basis of the content of its message. The Government
asserted an interest in "protecting the physical integrity of the flag under
all circumstances" to safeguard the flag's identity as the unique and
unalloyed symbol of the Nation. 128 While the Texas statute expressly
prohibited only those acts of physical desecration "that the actor knows
will seriously offend" onlookers, the Federal Protection Act prohibited
only those acts of desecration that cast contempt upon the flag.
The Eichman case involved circumstances of knowingly setting fire to
several United States flags on the steps of the United States Capitol
while protesting various aspects of the Government's domestic and
foreign policy. Affirming the ruling in Johnson, the Court held that
there was no essential difference between the new Congressional statute
and the Texas statute that had already been declared unconstitutional.
Although the Flag Protection Act contained no explicit content-based
limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it was nevertheless clear
that the Government's asserted interest is related to the suppression of
free expression, and concerned with the content of such expression.
Notably, the Court added:
Government may create national symbols. promote them, and encourage their
respectful treatment. But the Flag Protection Act goes beyond this by criminally
proscribing expressive conduct because of its likely communicative impact.
129
In 1995, the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved a
proposed constitutional amendment, which provided: "Congress and the
states shall have the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the
American flag." However, this attempt was unsuccessful; the Senate
rejected the proposed amendment because the campaign for constitutional
amendment was viewed as an effort to undermine the Bill of Rights.
130
127. 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990).
128. United States v. Eichman. 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990).
129. 496 U.S. 318 (1990). In dissenting, Justice Stevens asserted what I view as a
very extreme example. according to which the communicative value of a well-placed
bomb in the Capitol does not entitle it to the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at
323.
130. FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 126-27.
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Examining these cases leaves no doubt that the Court constantly
avoided tangling with substantive criminal law. At stake was a classic
question of what makes conduct a crime, but the Court did not go
beyond the classic and conventional pure constitutional analysis. Leading
criminal law scholars have also given this criticism, as I shall shortly
elaborate on in the next chapter.
D. "All That Fuss For Nothing": Constitutional Gaps
& Theoretical Disabilities
The Court's methodology in approaching the flag-burning dilemma
has been the subject of an extraordinary volume of scholarly writings, to
the extent that one may not approach this issue without first sketching a
panorama of the most commonly provided peculiar arguments. These
are arguments that pay attention not only to theories of constitutional
law, but primarily to fundamental principles of criminal law theory and
its possible nexus to constitutional values.
In his influential book Loyalty, Fletcher contends that Johnson turned
out to be an easy case, because the statute in question made flag
desecration conditional on the likelihood that the act would cause
""serious offense" to a hypothetical observer. Fletcher suggests that "[t]he
foundations of the criminal law need reconstructing to recognize that we
should express certain wrongs not as offensive conduct to individuals
but as a violation of our certain collective sense of what is permissible in
the public space. 1 3 1 Fletcher suggests the degree and depth of a
consensus supporting the prohibition as one of several factors that would
have to be considered in assessing public decency.1 32 In this regard,
Kent Greenawalt has correctly added that "so long as the flag is used
extensively at public and publicized ceremonies that support government
policies, any ideal of 'neutrality' for the national symbol is elusive, and a
ban on desecration obliquely supports the status quo. 133
The two critical examples are of great importance in illustrating my134
initial argument that the flag enigma 1 is a classic case primarily
involving questions of the theory of substantive criminal law that clash
with fundamental principles of constitutional law. For this, not only do
constitutional and criminal theories have to be approached separately,
but rather the interplay between both theories must be investigated.
131. FLETCHER, supra note 104, at 146-47.
132. Id. at 147.
133. GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, supra note 76,
at 160.
134. 1 borrow this expression from Kradewagen, supra note 86, at 683.
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Having put the discussion on the constitutionality of the criminal
prohibition against flag desecration in order, thus setting out the grounds,
including the leading Supreme Court cases, on which the American de
lege lata has been delineated, pointing out the adherence of the Court to
pure constitutional analysis, instead of tangling with the terminology of
substantive criminal law, let us turn to the theoretical discussion. In Part
V, I set forth my arguments on constitutional understanding of criminal
theory. In Part VI, I will then step back and re-focus the discussion
around the criminal prohibition against flag desecration.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF CRIMINAL THEORY
Law is not merely a system of enforceable rules where the rules might have
any content whatsoever. The law establishes an ordering of men so as to reduce
certain recognized evils. It involves an accommodation of the interests of
human being that may come into conflict. 1
35
It is wrong to argue that the American Constitution contains no
language of substantive criminal law. The Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution speaks of two complementary notions, namely, "Criminal
Prosecution" and "Crime":
In all criminal prosecutions. the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed. 1
36
American jurisprudence provides few cases that explore the meaning
of Crime, paying no serious attention to the conceptual meaning of
Criminal Prosecution. 137 However, words matter; a legal system is not a
confederation of laws. In creating common law, unlike in creating
enacted laws, the judge is a senior partner. 138 The terms Criminal
Prosecution and Crime occupy a fundamental conceptual position in
criminal law theory. Therefore, in my opinion, the Constitution does
include language of the substantive criminal law. It is only a question of
constitutional interpretation.
135. HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 24 (1976).
136. U.S. CONST. amend XI (emphasis added).
137. John W. Poulos, Liability Rules, Sentencing Factors, and the Sixth Amendment
Right to a Jury Trial: A Preliminary Inquiry. 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 643, 644 (1990).
138. BARAK, supra note 45, at xviii.
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The concepts Crime and Criminal Prosecution challenge the conventional
wisdom on the various segments of criminal law theory, such as: criminal
punishment,139 culpability,14° guilt,141 and dangerousness, 142 as well as the
meaning of criminal wrongdoing, the act requirement,1 43 mental disorder,
justifications, 144 excuses and mitigation. 145 To this extent, substantive
criminal law is an intrinsic concept of the American Constitution.
Moreover, the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause have
been among the most important pillars in developing the jurisprudence
of criminal law. The Due Process Clause guarantees no criminal
punishment may be imposed arbitrarily, if criminals are to be treated as
ends and not means. In addition, the Equal Protection Clause requires
that criminals, as humans, ought to be treated with dignity, thus enjoying
equal worth.
Substantive criminal law declares what acts are crimes, punishable
wrongs, and prescribes the punishment for committing them.1 46  This
article inquires into the meaning of criminal wrongdoing, since it makes
no sense to understand the concepts of Criminal Prosecution and Crime,
if we do not know what makes actions criminally prohibited in the first
place.1 47 However, to achieve this goal, I shall delineate a theory in two
parts. First, I shall prove that the "wrongdoing" element is a constitutional
requirement, inherent to all Criminal Prosecutions. And second, I shall
inquire into the constitutional meaning of "criminal wrongdoing."
139. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 25: H.L.A. HART, PUISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILTY 1
28(1968).
140. H.L.A. HART. supra note 139. at 162.
141. Wattad, supra note 12, at 525-48; 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF
CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 298 (2007).
142. Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Is Terrorism a Crime or an Aggravating
Factor in Sentencing?, 4 J. INT'L. CRIM. JUST. 1017 (2006).
143. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 59; MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME (1993);
Douglas Husak. Does Criminal Liability Require an Act?, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 60 (Antony Duff ed., 1998).
144. For example: GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRvE OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD
GOETZ AND THE LAW ON TRIAL (1988); Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Resurrecting
"Romantics at War": International Self-Defense in the Shadow of the Law of War
Where Are the Borders?, 13 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 205 (2006).
145. Joshua Dressler. Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and
Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1336 (1989); Douglas N.
Husak. Partial Defenses. 11 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 167, 177 (1998).
146. JOHN C. KLOTTER, CRIMINAL LAW 2-3 (1983).
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A. Why "Wrongdoing"? With Dignity Shall
"Crime and Punishment"
The human nature acts as a complete entity, with all that is in it, consciously
or unconsciously, and though it may be wrong. it's nevertheless alive.'
48
The Right to dignity is the mother of all human rights, located up in
the ivory tower. 49 However, not all constitutions explicitly accord protection
to human dignity, e.g., Canada and the United States. One way of
recognizing a constitutional right to dignity is through interpretation
of the right to equality, 5 0 or through interpretation of the whole Bill of
Rights.' 5 Human dignity requires that a person be treated as the world
unto himself, and an objective unto himself, a free agent, who is capable
of developing his body and mind as he wishes.
15 2
The American Constitution contains some cognate concepts of the
theory of human dignity, among them the Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause. Since its inception, through the lenses of the
right to Due Process, the Court has been able to scrutinize the process by
which criminal procedures and its substance are being undertaken. The
Equal Protection Clause also provides certain premises for the right to
dignity. The core meaning of dignity is that social order must reflect
recognition of the equal worth of all persons. The guarantee of the right
to dignity means a prohibition against humiliating a person by treating
them as a means rather than an end. 5 3 Though it is permissible to
differentiate between two persons on the basis of relevant considerations,
sometimes this kind of differentiation is associated with stigmatic
characteristics, in particular when it is based on ignoring distinctive
human features related to the human ability to make rational and moral
choices between right and wrong.
In the context of crime and punishment, the wrongdoing factor reflects
the concept of right and wrong as recognized by the community,
148. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM UNDERGROUND 27 28 (Mirra Ginsburg
trans., 2005).
149. Williams J. Brennan. Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEx. L. REV. 433, 439 (1986).
150. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration). [1999] 1 S.C.R.
497, 507 (Can.); BARAK, supra note 45, at 88.
151. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
152. BARAK, supra note 45, at 86.
153. ARISTOTLE, A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT 141 95 (William Ellis trans.. 1912)
(322 B.C.).
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denoting the moral quality of the act. A criminal offense is an anti-
social phenomenon. "The wrongness of the phenomenon lies in its anti-
social harm to a legally protected interest [and] ... is the product of the
anti-social nature of the act, and of the anti-social nature of the result.,
154
Punishment is given for a wrong.1 55 Punishment is an attempt to
demonstrate to the wrongdoer that his act was wrong, not only to
recognize the act as wrong, but to show him its wrongness by bringing
to him the nature of what he has done to realize. 156 For a person to be
treated as an end, and for a punishment to be justified at all, the
criminal's act must be that of a responsible agent, namely, it must be the
act of one who could have kept the law which one has broken. And at
the sentencing stage, the punishment must bear some sort of relation to
the act. 157 The threat of punishment is not only a conditional threat of a
painful sanction, but also an official expression of how negatively
different kinds of actions or omissions are judged. 158 Condemnation is
the community's reaction to the violation of the social order, namely the
violation of certain protected interests of the community. For the dignity
of all criminals, the community may not denounce all criminals in the
same manner, for if the community so does, not only does the
community humiliate them as objects, but the community also violates
their right to due process by imposing community condemnation so
arbitrarily. This is what I consider to be constitutional punishment.1 59
B. The Meaning of "Wrongdoing"
With intelligence shall man distinguish between the true and the false. 160
Criminal law must have moral connotation if criminal punishment is
to have meaning. The state may not make any conduct a crime.
Criminals are first and foremost human beings. As such, they enjoy the
right to dignity. 61 Once you treat a human being as a means, rather than
154. GHANAYIM. supra note 55, at 2.
155. SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 4; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE
AND SANCTIONS (1993).
156. ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHY EXPLANATIONS 366, 370 (1981).
157. H.L.A. HART. PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 160 (1968).
158. JOHN SMITH & BRIAN HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 4 (8th ed. 1996).
159. ARTHURRIPSTEIN. EQUALITY. RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 140-41 (1999).
160. MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED 23-26 (Shlomo Pines
trans., 1963).
161. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 43; IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 46 (1949); Eckert Klein, Human Dignity in German
Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE (David Kretzmer &
Eckart Klein eds.. 2002): George P. Fletcher. Human Dignity as a Constitutional
Value, 22 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV. 171 (1984); Wattad, supra note 142, at 1027.
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an end, you treat them as an object, rather than a subject, and this form
of humiliation infringes human dignity. You humiliate a person by
ignoring their ability as a human being to distinguish between what is
right and wrong, you humiliate a person when you do not distinguish
between intentional wrongdoings and accidental ones, 162 and you humiliate
a person by ignoring a possibility of negating wrongdoing committed in
circumstances of justification. 163 To treat a human being as a subject,
you must consider the person to be capable of a rational choice, because
when you treat a human being as an inanimate object, your responses to
the human being are determined not by their choices, but yours, in
disregard of or with indifference to theirs. In the context of speech
offenses, this understanding becomes especially important. The suppression
of certain views represents a kind of contempt for citizens, which is
inherently objectionable and independent of its consequences, because it
fails to treat citizens equally or with the dignity they deserve. Equal
treatment of all citizens requires the enabling of all views to be
expressed even, and especially, if they are the less favorable ones.
64
With inelegance shall man distinguish between right and wrong, and
with intelligence shall man distinguish between wrongs and punishable
wrongs. Criminal liability is the most draconian form of condemnation
by society, and may result in a sentence which amounts to a severe
deprivation of the ordinary liberties of the offender.165 H.L.A. Hart once
asked why certain kinds of actions are forbidden by law and so made
crimes or offenses. 166 Fyodor Dostoevsky has passionately expressed
the view that society is morally justified in punishing people simply
because they had done wrong. It goes without saying that criminal
law is not about the law of rights, but rather about the law of wrongs,
namely about the prevention of the kind of negative actions against
which society revolts. Criminalizing an act is to declare the act not
merely an undesirable act but as one that must not be done, "to institute
a threat of punishment to supply a pragmatic reason for not doing it, and
to censure those who nevertheless do it.'
168
162. FLETCHER. supra note 2. at 59.
163. FLETCHER, supra note 144.
164. GREENAWALT, FREE SPEECH JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 76. at 153.
165. ASHWORTH, supra note 45, at 3, 83.
166. HART, supra note 157. at 6.
167. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Richard Pevear & Larissa
Volokhonsky trans., 1993).
168. ASHWORTH, supra note 45, at 22.
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The question remains, what kind of acts may the legislature criminalize?
1 69
Criminal law is the law of public wrongs, 70 those which endanger the
common wealth and not just an individual person, crimen publicum,171 or
as called in old Roman law delicta publica.172 Conceptually speaking, a
crime is a violation of norms of correct conduct under a particular
recognized mental state. Let us call the violation of norms of correct
conduct wrongdoing; in which case a crime is the commission of wrongdoing
to which a certain mental state is attached. A criminal offense is an anti-
social phenomenon. "The chief concern of the criminal law is seriously
anti-social behavior., 173 Criminal law is a mechanism of formal and
normative recognition of social perceptions. Criminal liability carries
the strong implication of "ought not to do;" which marks out the special
social significance of criminal censure that requires a clear social
justification. The wrongness of the phenomenon lies in its anti-social
harm to a legally protected interest, and is the product of the anti-social
nature of the act, and of the anti-social nature of the result.1 74 Being
punished for a crime is different from being regulated in the public.
Even in the absence of other means of social control available to achieve
the same ends, criminal prohibition must be the last means, and the
alternative of doing nothing must still be considered.
1 75
Criminal acts may be one of two basic types: (1) public wrongs, and
(2) moral wrongs. The obvious starting point of any discussion of
criminalization is the harm principle, which suggests that crimes are
generally acts which have a particularly harmful effect on the public and
do more than interfere with merely private rights.1 76 In other words,
"crime is crime because it consists of wrongdoing which directly, and in
serious degree threatens the security or well-being of society, and
because it is not safe to leave it redressable only by compensation for the
169. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 125 (1991).
170. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 4 5
(Wayne Morrison ed., 1769) [hereinafter 4 BLACKSTONE]. Blackstone recognizes crimes
as public wrongs, as distinguished from torts, which are private wrongs.
171. KANT, supra note 169, at 140.
172. 1 JOHN PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 16 (8th
ed. 1892); J.W. CECIL TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 5-6 (16th ed.
1952).
173. ASHWORTH, supra note 45, at 1.
174. GEORGE E. Dix & M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS 147 (1973).
175. See SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957, Cm. 247, at 14. See also Shaw v.
Director of Public Prosecutions. (1961) 2 All ER 446 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Crim.
App.) (Eng.); The Abortion Case of 1975, Feb. 25, 1975 BVerfG, 39BVerfGE 1.
176. MILL, supra note 63, at 15. Cf 4 JOEL FEINBERG. THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 124 (1988).
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party injured."' 7  This has been articulated by John Stuart Mill, who
formulated the harm principle as "the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will;" namely preventing harm to others. 1'7 8
However, there are offenses meant to punish conduct simply because
it is wrong in itself.1 9 In the early days, this concept was limited to the
most outrageous and immoral acts, e.g., murder, robbery, rape etc., mala
in se.'8 ° But the test of morality is obviously of no great help today,
because many acts are prohibited on the grounds of social expediency, or
at least not just because of their immoral nature, mala prohibita.'8' To
demonstrate the problematic features of mala in se crimes, I shall
consider some examples. The prohibitions against sodomy and obscenity
have been justified by their arguably intrinsic wrongful natures. This
has gradually changed as movements fighting for gay rights have sprung
up. Another example concerns lying-which, although intrinsically immoral,
standing in itself is not a crime. For lying to become a crime, it has to be
associated with some extra features, such as lying in court under oath,
which is a crime not because of the intrinsic wrong associated with
lying, but rather because of the likely consequences of false judgment.
1. Basic Concepts on "Wrongdoing"
Coming to address mala in se offenses, fundamental principles of
criminal law theory must be considered. There is intuitive appeal in the
idea that criminal wrongs are typically more serious than their civil
counterparts; sufficiently serious that the state is empowered to step in
and regulate them directly. The public as a whole has an interest in their
prevention and prosecution. 82 Community norms and views determine
criminal prohibition.183 The main purpose of the criminal law is to
177. SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 158, at 17. See also H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY,
AND MORALITY 47 (1963); DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 231
(1987); Albin Eser, The Principle of 'Harm' in the Concept of Crime, 4 DUQ. L. REV.
345, 346 (1966).
178. MILL, supra note 63, at 9.
179. FLETCHER. supra note 104, at 129-30.
180. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 456, 458, 472, 473 (2000);
SIVIESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 2; SMITH & HOGAN, supra note 158. at 18.
181. Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress:
Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offences, 46 EMORY L.J.
1533, 1570 (1997).
182. SIVIESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 2.
183. 1 SCHNEYEZ ZALMAN FELLER, CRIMINAL LAW 115 (Rute Gabizon ed., 1966).
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prohibit conduct which a sufficiently strong part of the community feels
or believes is harmful to its interests, its safety, its social stability, and
which the community is shocked by. The general purposes of the
provisions governing the definition of offenses in the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code section 1.02 might be taken as a statement
of the proper objectives of the substantive law of crime in a modem legal
system. The purposes are: (1) to forbid and prevent conduct that
unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens substantial harm to
individual or public interests, (2) to subject to control persons whose
conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes, (3) to safeguard
conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal, (4) to give
fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to be an offense, and
(5) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offenses.
The question of criminalizing intrinsic wrongs has always challenged
mankind. Deontologists argue that the fact that the wrongdoing is an
action that does not respect the person's worth is what makes it
wrong.18 4 Jeffrie Murphy has elaborated on this view:
One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not simply that they
hurt us in some tangible or sensible way; it is because such injuries are also
messages-symbolic communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of
saying to us, 'I count but you do not.' 'I can use you for my purposes,' or 'I am
here up high and you are there down below.' Intentional wrongdoing insults us
and attempts (sometimes successfully) to degrade us and thus it involves a
kind of injury that is not merely tangible and sensible. It is moral injury, and we
care about such injuries.18
5
Among the principal legal problems of mala in se offenses is their
uncertain nature. The meaning that should be given to a criminal legal
norm is not fixed for eternity, but rather it is a part of life; and life
changes.8 6 "The life of law is renewal based on experience and logic,
which adapt law to the new social reality."' 87 Criminal norms must be
of great level of clarity and certainty if it is to avoid vagueness. The Due
Process Clause requires that all criminal prohibitions must provide fair
notice to persons before making their activity criminal. 88 However,
morality is intrinsically uncertain and debatable, and therefore for an
immoral act to be criminalized it must have extra characteristics of
outrageousness; this should be the immorality that shocks the man's
mind and his conscious e.g., incest or obscenity. In addition, for these
184. KANT, supra note 169, at 140-45.
185. Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 25
(Jeffrie Murphy & Jean Hampton eds.. 1988).
186. BARAK, supra note 45, at 9.
187. Id. at 4; ef OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
188. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
1/9/2009 9:53:51 AM
WAYFAD 
1 92009 9 5351 AiM
[VOL. 10: 5. 2008] Grounds for Preserving "National Unity"?
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
immoral acts to be criminalized, they must violate nearly universally
shared views about morality.
It is, however, my view that morality can be enforced by criminal
means, but not always. No conduct should be defined as criminal unless
it represents a serious threat to society, and unless the act cannot be dealt
with through other social or legal means. Immoral acts are indeed wrongs,
but not necessarily punishable wrongs. There must be an intrinsic common
quality to distinguish criminal from non-criminal. 189 It might be true
that law and social morality will constrain much of the same behavior,
but this does not mean that the law will enforce every aspect of morality.' 90
Criminal law is a crude instrument, requiring findings of uncertain facts,
with rules backed by a limited arsenal of coercive sanctions.
With logic shall man distinguish between right and wrong; what is
right shall not be wrong, and what is wrong cannot be right. Right and
wrong are, paradigmatically, contradictory concepts. In a constitutional
democracy, e.g., the United States, Israel, South Africa, Germany, and
Canada, legal norms are driven by the will of the people and for the will
of the people. The laws of any society must be acceptable to the general
moral sense of the community if they are to be respected and enforced.
A total departure from morality will bring horrific consequences.' 19 By
nature, society suffers from diversity. In order to avoid any abuse of minority
views by the majority, it is important to consider the will of society in
light of higher values of constitutionalist nature, which guarantee that
all members of society be able to exercise their rights in an equal
manner, thus being treated with dignity, as ends rather than means.
However, there are many controversial conducts, and their classification
between right and wrong is a matter of perspective. In this regard, I
shall consider two important principles. First, what society views as a
wrong is not necessarily a punishable wrong. For a wrong to be punishable,
it must, first and foremost, meet fundamental principles of criminal law
theory. Second, among the fundamental principles of the theory of
criminal law are clarity, certainty, and stability; as a concept of due
189. P. J. FITZGERALD, CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNISHMENT 3 (1962): SCHLOMO
SHOHAM, THE MARK OF CAIN: THE STIGMA THEORY OF CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVIATION 47
(1970).
190. Kent Greenawalt, Commentaries: Legal Enforcement of Aforality, 85 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710 (1995).
191. SCOTTISH HOME DEPARTMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957, Cm. 247, at 14. See also 1 BISHOP. supra note
172, at 19.
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process of law, as well as fair and just warning. 192 If doubt exists about
the wrongful nature of a certain conduct, or about its criminal features,
the actor must get the benefit of the doubt. The general prohibition against
retroactive criminal legislation, ex post facto laws, provides some
guidance in understanding this third consideration. The principle is also
expressed in the Latin maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege,
there is no crime, no punishment, without prior legislative warning.
1 93
The basic principle is that individuals have a right to know what the law
is at the time they are said to violate it, and therefore the law, i.e., the
criminal prohibition, has to be as clear as possible, as narrow as possible,
and as definitive as possible. Individuals do not have a right to know
that which could make utilitarian differences in their choice to engage in
an action or not. Rather, they have a right to know that which could
make a moral difference in their choice to engage in an action or not.
2. Notes on the "Social Protected Interest"
Society's observation has had a very significant role in the history of
criminal law development, referred to as the "social protected interest.
1 94
The social protected interest concept is the legitimacy for every criminal
prohibition. A conduct may not be criminalized solely because the
legislature has decided so, unless the conduct, first and foremost, does
not fit the general public consciousness and values. 195 Albeit, criminal
law is not required to embrace all social views and conducts. The social
protected interest has to be of great importance, to the extent that it may
not be sufficiently protected except by the coercive tools of criminal law.
In seeking to articulate a criminal prohibition, it is accordingly necessary
to: first, locate the social protected interest; second, clarify the concrete
substance of this social protected interest; and third, decide whether the
particular social protected interest deserves and requires protection by
criminal means, namely, examining less intrusive means, such as civil
law and administrative law.1 96
3. Notes on the Harm Principle versus the Offense Principle
I have already addressed the harm principle as a primary basis for
criminalizing certain actions. However, one must not confuse Mill's harm
192. FLETCHER. supra note 180, at 569 73.
193. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 12.
194. P. J. FITZGERALD, SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 123 24 (12th ed. 1966).
195. KHALID GHANAYIM ET AL., LIBEL LAW-A CRIMINAL OFFENCE AND A CIVIL
TORT: DE LEGE LATA DE LEGE FERENDA 25 28 (2005) (in Hebrew).
196. Eser, supra note 177.
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principle' 97 as a basis for penal legislation with the offense principle.
Joel Feinberg has tried to account for our shared understanding of the
conceptual distinction between the two principles. 198 In his view, the
harm principle supports penal legislation as a means of preventing harm
to other persons, in the absence of other means of equal effectiveness at
no greater cost to other values. Unlike the harm principle, the offense
principle suggests that: "[i]t is always a good reason in support of a
proposed criminal prohibition that it is probably necessary to prevent
serious offense to persons other than the actor and would probably be an
effective means to that end if enacted."' 199 This conceptual distinction
contributes to our understanding of the basic difference between the two
principles as basis for penal legislation.
Not every offense to others causes harm, for offense is a less serious
thing than harm.200 As Fienberg explains, the word "offense" has two
possible meanings; one refers to a miscellany of disliked mental states,
and the other concerns those states only when caused by the wrongful
conduct of others. In Fienberg's view, only the second meaning is
intended in the offense principle to be parallel to the harm principle.
That is, continued extreme offense can cause harm to a person "who
becomes emotionally upset over the offense, to the neglect of his real
interest. But the offended mental state in itself is not a condition of
harm."
,20 1
Considering the nature of the harm principle as a basis for penal
legislation, one may wonder if the offense principle can serve as a basis
for such legislation. It has already been said that consequences of offense
are not as serious as those of harm, and therefore, generally speaking,
the law should not treat offenses and harms as if they are of the same
degree of seriousness; for instance, in the event there exists other means
of regulation, which afford the same degree of effectiveness, the law should
202avoid controlling offensiveness by means of criminal law. This is not
to suggest that criminal law should neglect offense to others altogether;
however, other alternative effective means must be considered before
adhering to criminal law, such as "licensing procedures that depend on
197. See supra text accompanying note 177.
198. 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENSE TO
OTHERS 1-3 (1988).
199. Id. at xiii.
200. Id. at 2.
201. Id. at3.
202. Id. at 25.
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administrative suspension of license as a sanction., 20 3 I re-address the
offense principle in Part VI(B)(4) using several concrete examples.
As I have initially provided, the fact that a particular criminal
prohibition meets the fundamental principles of criminal law does not
mean it is a constitutional prohibition. This has been my initial argument: A
punishable wrong is not a valid crime unless it is constitutional. The
constitutionality of any criminal prohibition is required in light of the
coercive nature of criminal law. As I have already argued, constitutional
law strikes a balance between constitutional rights and other important
social interests. Criminal law is about limiting rights, but constitutional
law is about their protection. Constitutional law guarantees that criminal
law limits human rights in a proportionate manner. I explain this in
depth in the following chapter.
C. Constitutional Criminalization
With regard to constitutional democracy, where values matter to the
same extent as the notion of human rights, things become more
complicated. The principles for determining when conduct "should"
be wrong can be derived from both statutory laws (Gesetz) and non-
statutory law (Recht).2 °4 This question must be resolved not only by
reference to criminal law, but by reference to the entire Legal Order.
It is my view that even if a conduct satisfies the fundamental principles
of criminal law theory, and therefore it could be a punishable wrong, the
question is still: Should this particular conduct be a punishable wrong?
These are two separate questions of could and should. However, the
question remains: How is the should question to be answered and
determined? For this, a constitutional theory has to be drawn. This
question illustrates the importance of the urgent understanding of
constitutionalizing substantive criminal law, as we shall shortly see.
Classifying certain types of conduct as wrongs undermines, confines,
and infringes constitutionally protected rights, most notably the right to
liberty and the right to dignity. This kind of infringement must be highly
scrutinized, if it is to be justified. Constitutional scrutiny is the balance
drawn between rights and punishable wrongs, and it reflects the inherent
non-absolute nature of constitutional rights. I view the right to dignity,
203. Id.
204. The Abortion Case of 1927, Mar. 11, 1927 RG, 61 RGSt 242;
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993,
88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 203 (F.R.G.);
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Jun, 9. 1970. 29
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] I (F.R.G).
205. Dawn Oliver, The Underlying Values of Public and Private Law, in THE
PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 217 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
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in this context, as the inalienable compass of rights and wrongs, of
constitutional law and criminal law, and of liberties and penalties. In my
view, for a crime to be constitutionally justified, it must meet three
cumulative criteria, "balancing formula":206 (1) the criminal prohibition
must befit the values of a constitutional democracy; (2) the prohibition
must be undertaken for a proper purpose; and (3) the criminalization
must be done in proportionality, namely, the legislature must scrutinize
and fine tune even the smallest details of its action, and consider the
myriad of potential alternatives, to determine the least offensive means.
Underlying this proportionality principle is the promise that rights may
not be infringed to a degree that is greater than necessary.
1. The Values of a Constitutional Democracy
Criminal prohibition infringes rights otherwise constitutionally protected,
so such an infringement must be highly justified by the fundamental
values of constitutional democracy, which justify legal rules and are the
reason for changing them.2 °7 I shall reiterate what I have already said on
the nature of a constitutional democracy. In a constitutional democracy,
the legislature is instructed by the will of the people, as a form of
safeguard of the rule of the majority and the protector of the minority's
human rights. Constitutional democracy must protect the liberties and
autonomy of the individual and guarantee his ability to exercise his
liberties in peaceful means, thus viewing the individual as the main
concern of its existence, as a free person, capable of developing his
character in accordance with his free will as well as his free choice. The
rule of Law plays an important role in locating the "values of a
constitutional democracy.,, 208 Correctly observed by Dworkin, 209 "we
must not be satisfied with a 'rule-book conception' of the rule of
law.... [rather] [i]t must be extended to the 'right conception' of the
rule of Law .... [which] means guaranteeing fundamental values of
morality, justice, and human rights, with a proper balance between these
206. On the comparative theoretical and constitutional origins of the elements of the
suggested balancing formula, including the proportionality test, see Mohammed Saif-
Alden Wattad, "Did God say, 'You shall not eat of any tree of the garden'? ": Rethinking
the "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" in Israeli Constitutional Law, (2005) OXFORD U.
COMP. L. F. 4, available at http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/wattad.shtml.
207. BARAK, supra note 45, at 57.
208. FLETCHER. supra note 31, at 11-42.
209. RONALD DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BRITAIN 11 (1990).
1/9/2009 9:53:51 AM
WATTAD 
1 92009 9 5351 AiM
and the other needs of society. 21°  Of course, every constitutional
democracy has its own fundamental values; still there are some common
21121ones, inter alia justice, morality, human rights, 2 social values of the
existence of the state and public safety within it, such as certainty and
stability in interpersonal arrangements, 23 and values of proper
conduct, e.g., reasonableness,
214 fairness, 21 5 and good faith. 2
16
2. A Proper Purpose
The values of constitutional democracy require that the legislature
may not limit rights except for a proper purpose, which fulfils the
promise of these values, namely, enabling the individual to exercise his
autonomy and liberties in peaceful means. The social protected interest-
which I have discussed under the fundamental principles of criminal
theory-reflects the proper purpose that may sufficiently justify the
limitation imposed by criminal means on constitutional rights.
The proper purpose according to which the legislature may criminally
prohibit certain conduct may not be articulated arbitrarily, but rather
with due process and in an equal manner.
3. Proportionality
The rule of Law means the guaranteeing of fundamental values such
as morality, justice, and human rights, with a proper balance between
these and the other needs of society. It is the rule of proper Law, which2 7
balances the needs of society and the individual. Proportionality
consists of three sub-tests: 218 (1) rational connection, which requires a
rational link between the means employed and the goal the legislature
wishes to accomplish; namely, there must be reasonable grounds for
expecting the legislation to be effective in achieving it objective; (2) less
210. BARAK, supra note 45. at 55.
211. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC
JUSTICE (1999).
212. NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (Allan Cameron trans., 1996); LOUIS
HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990): Lorraine E. Weinrib. The Supreme Court of Canada
in the Age of Rights: Constitutional Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental
Rights Under Canada's Constitution, 80 CAN. B. REV. 699 (2002).
213. DOUGLAS HODGSON, INDIVIDUAL DUTY WITHIN A HUMAN RIGHT DISCOURSE
(2003).
214. Neil MacCormick, On Reasonableness, in LES NOTIONS A CONTENU VARIABLE
EN DROIT (Chafm Perelman & Raymond Vander Elst eds.. 1984).
215. BARAK, supra note 45, at 58.
216. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith Its Recognition and
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982).
217. BARAK, supra note 45. at 55 56.
218. Cf The Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.).
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coercive means, which requires that of the range of means that can be
employed to accomplish the goal, the legislature must employ the least
harmful means; namely, the legislation must limit the right no more than
is necessary to achieve its objective; and (3) relativism, which demands
that the damage caused to the individual by the means employed, must
be in appropriate proportion to the benefit stemming from it; i.e., the
costs of the limitation must not exceed the benefits to be gained from
achieving the objective.
Let us now step back, to smoothly centralize the discussion and approach
the flag enigma.
VI. DE LEGE FERENDA: UNCONSTITUTIONAL CRIME
A wrong becomes a crime because we choose to make it so; and if we wish to
know why we so choose we can but search our hearts and observe how men, at
various stages of civilization, think and behave when frustrated by their
neighbours.219
"A right is not simply a legally protected interest we value highly
[but] ... the respect paid to a capacity for freely forming and pursuing
interests, a capacity that distinguishes humans from other beings and that,,220
is the basis of their claim to dignity2  While Robinson Crusoe does
not need human rights, Kafla does. Human rights are the rights of a
person as part of society; 222 and as such they are limited by the rights of
others and the needs of society. Both the scope and the limit of human
rights are derived from the constitutional dialectic.223 For this, rights can
never be traded off whenever necessary to produce greater overall value.
The right to liberty may not be limited by ordinary reasons except for the
equal right of all other human agents to liberty, and "so it is forfeited




219. Seton Pollock, The Distinguishing Mark of Crime. 22 MOD. L. REV. 495, 498
(1959).
220. Alan Brudner. Guilt Under the Charter: The Lure of Parliamentary Supremacy, 40
CRIM. L. Q. 287, 291 (1998). See also FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 43-58; Otto Lagodny,
Human Dignity and Its Impact on German Substantive Criminal Law and Criminal
Procedure, 33 ISR. L. REV. 575, 586 (1999).
221. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925).
222. BARAK, supra note 45, at 83.
223. The Queen v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136 (Can.) (Dickson. J.); Lorraine E.
Weinrib, Canada's Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?, 6 REV. CONST. STUD. 119, 127-
128 (2002).
224. Brudner, supra note 220, at 292.
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The flag enigma has been comprehensively addressed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. The constitutionality of the Government's interest in
preserving the integrity of the American flag, making it a crime to
desecrate the flag, has only been challenged by the Court following the
explicit language of the Flag Protection Act. In this article, it is not my
goal to discuss cases where desecrating the flag constitutes a breach of
the right to property of others, nor is it my desire to inquire into cases
where desecrating the flag causes public disorder. These cases can be
approached within the realm of crimes against property and crimes
against the public order and public safety. Moreover, I am not challenging
flag desecration associated with incitement and sedition; this might be
prohibited under fundamental theories of criminal law. In addition, I am
not targeting the flag desecration question under theories of victimless
crimes, e.g., unlawful possession offenses, which might be treated under
various theories of the harm principle. Instead, I shall narrow the
discussion to the largest problematic issue, where the legislature decides
to make it a crime to desecrate the flag as a matter of preserving the
integrity of the flag as such, in private or in public (the core problem).
This kind of question was raised in Eichman, and Eichman is the kind of
analysis I seek to criticize.
A. A Critique of Logic
Addressing the core problem, the Court in Eichman offered the
following reasoning: (1) flag desecration, if it is an expressive conduct,
is protected by the First Amendment, and therefore may not be
criminalized and punished; (2) the way to preserve the flag's special role
is not to punish those who feel differently about these matters; it is to
persuade them that they are wrong; and (3) government may create national
symbols, promote them, and encourage their respectful treatment. But
the Flag Protection Act goes well beyond this by criminally proscribing
expressive conduct because of its likely communicative impact. I
criticize the Court's analysis on several levels.
I find the Court's starting point problematic: "we consider whether
appellees' prosecution for burning a United States flag in violation of the
Flag Protection Act of 1989 is consistent with the First Amendment.,
225
But what sense does it make to challenge the constitutionality of the
prosecution of burning the flag, if it may not be a crime in the first
place! 226 The Court avoided launching an inquiry into substantive criminal
225. United States v. Eichman. 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
226. See also German Aviation Security Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht
[BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15. 2006, 115 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118 (F.R.G.).
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law.22 Moreover, underlying the Court's reasoning is the assumption
that if an act is constitutionally protected, it follows that the act may not
be criminalized. This cannot be true. Analyzing a constitutional right
includes three levels of scrutiny: (1) the recognition of a constitutionally
protected right; (2) the ambit of the right; and (3) the limits that a state
may impose on the right.22 8 To elaborate, consider the following example:
The right to liberty, which is constitutionally recognized within (1) includes
the right to nudity within (2). However, within (3), a state may prohibit
public nudity, as well as administratively regulate nudity on beaches, but
may not prohibit or regulate nudity in private.
In addition, the Court's reasoning ends where proper analysis of the
issue should begin. The Court's holding is limited solely to expressive
actions. That is, desecrating the flag would be considered a constitutional
crime if committed in the absence of any expressive purpose to convey a
message. This leaves the whole discussion open as to whether the
legislature may preserve the physical integrity of the flag by adhering to
the extremist intrusive means of criminal law. In my view, the issue
here is not the act, being as expressive act as pure conduct, but rather the
asserted social protected interest. Therefore the legal discussion should
start by examining the compatibility of the "physical integrity of the
flag" with the basic principles set forth above on the social protected
interest. In Eichman, the Court found a short way to circumvent the
complex problem. Ultimately, Eichman does not apply to cases where
desecrating the flag does not amount to expressive conduct.
B. The Practicalities of the Metaphysics of Critique
Is desecrating the flag a punishable wrong? And if yes, is it a constitutional
punishable wrong? I address these questions in turn.
227. In another place I argue that the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to
tangle with substantive criminal law, arguably because the Constitution includes no
language of the substantive criminal law. Wattad, supra note 12.
228. BARAK, supra note 45. at 82. See ASHWORTH. supra note 45, at 2: "The
contours of criminal liability may be considered under three headings: the range of the
offences [in respect of]: the scope of criminal liability [circumstances]; and the
conditions of criminal liability [the required degree of fault]."
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1. Could "Desecrating the Flag" Be A Crime?
it is my view that in a constitutional democracy, the legislature enacts
laws. Unlike the legislature, courts do justice (Law), by considering not
only enacted laws, but, primarily, ascertaining that these laws are consistent
with the Law. A constitutional democracy is expected to express that
which is fair and just, even if it contradicts the rule of the majority as
expressed by the legislature.
I have already expressed my view that if the legislature criminalizes a
particular kind of conduct in contradiction to the fundamental principles
of criminal law theory, this legislation must not remain valid.129 The
prohibition against flag desecration represents a kind of intrinsic wrong,
namely, it is arguably perceived as wrong conduct in itself. Fletcher
correctly contends that there is no longer a shared understanding of an
intrinsic wrong in abusing the flag, but only a wrong that exists in
causing offenses to observers, as is the case for idolatry and adultery.23 °
Fundamental principles of criminal theory provide that the threat of
criminal punishment is an official expression of how negatively different
conduct is judged.23 1 Imposing criminal prohibition requires consideration
of three questions in turn: (1) What is the asserted social protected
interest? (2) What is the concrete substance of this social protected
interest? And, (3) does the asserted social protected interest deserve and
require protection by criminal means?
The only reason to prevent, as a principle, flags from being defiled or
defaced is that the flag, arguably, has symbolic importance for citizens
as a mirror-image of the nation. The substance of this kind of asserted
social protected interest, as expressly announced by the Government in
Eichman, is to protect the physical integrity of the flag as such. This
implies that the flag is not exactly a medium, but rather a speech,
namely, the flag expresses one idea, i.e., national unity. However, no
conduct should be defined as criminal unless it represents a serious
threat to society. Immoral acts are indeed wrongs, but not all wrongs are
punishable wrongs. There must be an intrinsic common quality by which to
distinguish criminal from non-criminal. The prohibition against flag
desecration contains no serious threat to society, and does not come
close to any of the immoral conducts that might be plausibly regulated
by criminal means; those which shock one's mind. Without certainty of
the criminal nature of an immoral conduct, the criminalization may not
229. Hart, supra note 1.
230. FLETCHER. supra note 104, at 133.
231. ASHWORTH, supra note 45, at 20.
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hold, because fundamental principles of criminal law require clarity,
certainty, and stability of criminal norms. Only upon fair and just warning,
must persons be treated as ends of their rational choices, with dignity as
subjects.232 The criminal nature of flag desecration is surrounded with
heavy clouds of doubt, which leads one to think of such criminalization
as treating the human being as an object, as well as a means of a
doubtful national unity. Moreover, because of its coercive nature, the
criminal law must not be invoked except as the last resort, especially
when less coercive means are available. As I shall explain further in
Part VII, the flag is an opinion but not a fact; as such, its meaning is
disputable; 233 it is not a question of true and false opinions. Therefore,
the market-place of ideas is the most compatible means of preserving the
flag's special role.234
2. Should "Desecrating the Flag" Be A Crime?
I am ready to refrain from the discussion until the end, assuming that
one may come up with a theory in which flag desecration is a punishable
wrong. The question then becomes one of constitutional scrutiny,
constitutional crime, which must be addressed because of the coercive
nature of criminal law as a mechanism of limiting and infringing
human rights.
Free speech regulation, under American law, if it is content-based, as
it is for the purposes of our discussion, is subject to the highest level of
constitutional scrutiny, thus requiring the government to provide a
compelling state interest. However, this theory of constitutional scrutiny
does not suggest any solution for cases where a pure act of flag
desecration is at stake; such acts are punishable under statutes like the
Federal Protection Act, but were not addressed by the Court in Eichman,
even though a constitutional right to liberty was infringed. For this
reason, a complete formula of constitutional balances must be drawn. I
have already proposed what I call the balancing formula, and I will now
examine its application to the core problem.
232. Fletcher, supra note 180. at 569 73.
233. The Holocaust Denial Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal
Constitutional Court] Apr. 13, 2004. 90 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts
[BVerfGE] 241 (F.R.G.).
234. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310. 319 (1990) (Stevens. J.. dissenting);
HCJ 316/03 Bakri v. Israel Film Council, [2003] IsrSC 58(1) 249 (Isr.) (Procaccia, J.).
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Free speech is a value peculiar to every constitutional democracy. It
creates a market-place of ideas allowing a high degree of persuasion
rather than suppression of ideas, thereby according citizens equal worth
regardless of their status in society: in a free manner, with no threat of
being punished, and with dignity as beings capable of making rational
choices. Like the right to free expression, the right to liberty is among
the most fundamental values of a constitutional democracy, derived
directly from the inherent right to dignity, seeking to reflect the promise
that persons are free agents with free will.
However, in this context, not all types of speech carry equal
importance. The closer the speech is to the person's will and self, e.g.,
symbolic and political speech, the more expressive it is of the person's
dignity and his equal worth as a human being. This has been said of the
right to free speech, but it is also true with regard to the right to liberty.
The question now becomes: Is "preserving the physical integrity of the
flag as such" a proper purpose for limiting symbolic speech as well as
the right to liberty?
The values of a democratic state recognize proper purposes that may
justify limiting free speech and liberty of the person, e.g., the prohibition
against pornography and hate speech. Examining the proper purpose of
particular legislation does not require an examination of the means by
which the right has been limited, but rather focuses on the purpose itself.
I am not in a position to argue that preserving the physical integrity of
the flag as means of preserving national unity is an illegitimate object
that constitutional democracy may not seek to achieve. National unity is
an important interest of every society, even more so in diverse societies.
However, important as it may be, a proper purpose may not sufficiently
justify limiting constitutional rights except for a proportionate limitation.
Imposing criminal restraints upon a person's liberty and their right to
express themselves is a delicate exercise, and thus must be well justified.
The stronger the nexus between the infringed right and the person's
dignity, the higher the justification required to prohibit the speech or
restrict the person's liberty to act as a human being with dignity and free
will. Two examples illustrate this. The presumption of innocence illustrates
the sensitivity that criminal law must demonstrate toward limiting man's
liberty, holding the promise that a person is innocent until proven guilty.
In the same vein, a finding of guilt is only acceptable if it is "beyond a
reasonable doubt."
The proportionality test requires a rational connection between the
means employed and the goal the legislature is aiming to accomplish.
To constitutionally justify the prohibition against flag desecration, a
rational connection must exist between the proper purpose of preserving
national unity and the "criminal means." That is, the government must
1/9/2009 9:53:51 AM
WATTAD 
1 92009 9 5351 AiM
[VOL. 10: 5. 2008] Grounds for Preserving "National Unity"?
SAN DIEGO INT' LL.J.
explain that which suggests that criminal prohibition would guarantee a
stop to desecration of the flag, and would, moreover, grant the flag
special respect. To view my skepticism as to any possible argument for
such asserted rational connection, consider a prohibition against insults
to parents by their children. Is that what criminal law was promised to
protect!? Respect towards others or towards ideas!? I doubt it. A criminal
prohibition against desecrating the flag purports to impose on citizens a
sense of respect towards the flag. This kind of criminal prohibition
contradicts the fundamental purposes of criminal law theory, which I
have already addressed in earlier parts of the Article.
However, I am ready to take seriously the argument that such a
criminal prohibition would deter people from desecrating the flag, and
accordingly the physical integrity of the flag would be preserved, an
argument that, in my view, undermines the whole concept of respecting
the flag for the sake of "national unity." The question remains of the
existence of less intrusive means to achieve the asserted purpose of
preserving the physical integrity of the flag. The "less coercive means"
test requires the asserted means be the only means possible to achieve
the concrete purpose as articulated by the government. To preserve the
physical integrity of the flag as such it is plausible to suggest that
educational means be invoked, those which concern the potential
influential nature of the "word," of the market-place of ideas, and of the
power of persuasion.
But again, I am ready to assume that words will fail to guarantee
protection of the physical integrity of the flag, namely, people will not
be persuaded to respect the flag, and therefore this concrete purpose can
be achieved solely by criminal means. The last sub-test of the proportionality
test deals with the "cost-benefit" analysis, namely, weighing the damages.
On the one hand, criminal punishment has a draconian and harsh
nature, it puts persons in jail, deprives them of their dignity, liberty, and
property in some cases. Criminal punishment causes huge damage to the
human persona, to one's reputation, to one's social life, and to one's
career. Punishing a person for their speech is a form of humiliating the
person's dignity, suppressing their soul, depressing their will, and
suffocating their brain. On the other hand, the damage that results from
desecrating the flag is small; it does not even come close to the damage
caused to the individual because of the criminal punishment. It is not the
case that people wake up every morning willing to desecrate the flag, but
rather such desecration occurs in very limited and concrete occasions. In
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addition, it is not the argument that desecrating the flag directly or
indirectly undermines national unity and solidarity, but rather that by
such prohibition it would be possible to achieve national unity.
However, criminal law by nature is a reactive system; it is not the law of
shall do, but the law of shall not do. Finally, there is no proof that
preserving the physical integrity of the flag will guarantee such arguable
national unity. There are purposes that cannot be achieved even by the
best means, because these are disproportionate means. It is thus my
view: the damage caused to the person upon such criminal prohibition
outweighs the damage that may occur in the absence of such prohibition,
and therefore such crime, being disproportionate, may not be constitutional.
3. Bolts of Doubt
The meaning of the flag is doubtful: Does it really express the sense
of national unity? The essence of the flag is doubtful: Is it a medium or
speech? The nature of the flag is doubtful: Does it have its own? Or,
does it represent that which is expressed by the government? The
wrongful nature of desecrating the flag is doubtful: Is it an undesirable
conduct? Or, is it an immoral wrong? The criminal nature of desecrating
the flag is doubtful: Is it really the kind of conduct for which society is
willing to punish persons? Or, is it the kind of conduct that should be
treated by means of tolerance and education? The constitutionality of
the flag is doubtful: Is it possible to grant the flag constitutional
protection? Does such protection fulfill the purposes underlying the
theory of constitutional protection? And finally, the constitutionality of
the criminal prohibition against desecrating the flag is doubtful: Is there
any compelling state interest that may justify limiting fundamental
values of a constitutional democracy, free speech and liberty, by criminal
means?
With so many doubts, I doubt if a criminal prohibition against
desecrating the flag, aiming to preserve the physical integrity of the flag
as such, thus achieving national unity, may fit criminal law theory and
the constitutional scrutiny over substantive criminal law. Such prohibition
stands in contrast to the most fundamental principles of every possible
legal theory.
4. Postscript of SelfContemplations
The discussion set out above begs the question of the constitutionality
of the criminalization of the desecration of other symbols of a different
nature. Fletcher once challenged me with several examples: (1) urinating
on the Lincoln Memorial; (2) having lunch at the Kotel, the Wailing
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Wall, on Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement; (3) having sex in the
street; and (4) tombstone desecration. Would these be considered
constitutional crimes according to the theory I have sought to articulate
in this Article?
It is my view that the state may constitutionally punish having sex in
the street, which involves an exercise in balancing a person's right to
liberty with public decency. While prohibiting nudity and sex in private
places would be disproportionate criminalization, prohibiting such public
activity expresses an exact proportionate balance between individual
rights and other important public interests. This is also the case with
having lunch at the Kotel on Yom Kippur, for in these circumstances the
important interest of public disorder as well as the interest in preventing
offense to the feelings of others must be balanced against the individual's
liberty to act by his free will. Such criminalization prohibits eating at
Yom Kippur in a place where only religious people go, especially on
Yom Kippur. If the prohibition was against eating on Yom Kippur at all, it
should then be considered unconstitutional for its disproportional nature.
However, I shall add this: having lunch at the Kotel on Yom Kippur is
the kind of offense to others that I have addressed, in Part V(B)(3), in
light of Feinberg's conceptual distinction between harm to others and
offense to others.235 According to that distinction, given the availability of
other means less coercive in nature than criminal law such as administrative
law-especially municipal regulations, which may successfully and
effectively prevent such offense to the feeling of religious people who
attend the Kotel on Yom Kippur-I believe criminal prohibition should
be avoided in these circumstances. In any case, I am ready to assume, in
light of the extreme religious nature of the Kotel, as well as the fact that
the extreme majority of those who attend the Kotel on Yom Kippur are
religious people, that such offense to feelings amounts to a serious and
extreme offense that is equivalent to harm, and therefore may serve as a
basis for penal legislation.
As for the example of urinating on the Lincoln Memorial, the Lincoln
Memorial itself is not a sufficiently important social protected interest
that deserves to be protected by criminal means. In addition, it is not the
role of criminal law to accord a sense of respect towards others or
things; for criminal law is the law of shall not do. However, it is indeed
a constitutional crime to prohibit such act for the same reasons having
235. 2 FEINBERG, supra note 198.
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sex in the street, public nudity and urinating in the street are constitutional
crimes. Urinating on the Lincoln Memorial is an improper public behavior
that may constitutionally be prohibited by criminal law as a matter of
public decency. Again, it is not about the Lincoln Memorial, but the act of
urinating in a public place itself.
The final example is that which concerns a prohibition against
tombstone desecration, which I view as constitutional criminalization.
Such criminalization is possible under any theory of crimes against
property and crimes against public order. Such criminalization is not
intended to preserve the memory of those for whom the tombstone was
constructed, but rather to prevent damage to the property of others, as
well as to prevent vandalism.
To conclude, I reiterate what I have already underlined: It has the
ultimate purpose of this article to debate the situation where legislatures
have decided to make it a crime to desecrate the flag as a matter of
preserving the flag's integrity as such, in private or in public, as a means
of preserving national unity. This is the question raised in Eichman, and
this is what I sought to challenge.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It is time now to conclude what has already been provided in length.
Recent decades of legal study have demonstrated strong adherence
amongst legal jurisdictions. It has been correctly believed that
constitutional law must play a dominant role in protecting human rights,
as well as in the twilight zone that is very often encountered by the
powers of the three governmental branches. Constitutional law has the
inherent mechanism required for drawing balances between conflicted
interests, as well as between rights and duties. Given this, constitutional
law has its influence over various spheres of legal studies, leading
among them criminal law, where human rights are most likely to be
violated. In the area of criminal law, constitutional law has been viewed
as the safeguard for protecting human rights, thus forbidding violation of
human rights but only when, and to the degree, the constitutional
promise allows; with proportionality, reasonability, and in accordance
with the demands ofjustice.
Of course, different legal jurisdictions have different implementations
of the theory of constitutionalism. This is obvious, for each jurisdiction
has its own constitutional tradition, history, and sociopolitical structure. Yet,
neither jurisdiction would dispute the core components of constitutionalism.
However, among other legal issues that have been in dispute is the
extent to which constitutional law applies to criminal law. In particular,
this has involved the question of the applicability of constitutional law,
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including the power of judicial review as driven by the constitutional
scrutiny theory, to substantive criminal law. On its face, the problem is
not clear, for substantive criminal law is the classic mechanism under
which human rights are infringed, and if constitutional law does not
intervene here, then what role does constitutional law play at all?
The argument has been, for instance, that if we subject substantive
criminal law to constitutional law it would provide for an absurd constitutional
analysis, according to which e.g., a person has a constitutional right to
liberty which includes the right to kill. However, it is not until the
second level of analysis that we assert the limitation of constitutional
protection to "liberty," thus excluding its extension to killing. In the
context of the killing example, those who oppose such constitutionalization
of substantive criminal law argue that the right to liberty does not
include in the first place the right to kill others.
The story for American jurisprudence has been easier. Keeping
faithful to textualism and the Framer's intent, the Americans argue that
since the U.S. Constitution limits its protection to the law of criminal
procedure, then the Constitution does not apply to substantive criminal
law except in those instances where the Constitution applies explicitly,
such as in the case of the death penalty. It has been my view in this
article that the American approach demonstrates an extremely superficial
understanding of substantive criminal law, as well as a considerable
over-simplification of constitutional thought. Holding that the U.S.
Constitution includes some cogent concepts of human dignity, which
requires a finding of guilt in order for a criminal system to punish a
person for committing a wrongdoing, taken together with a purposive
understanding of the Sixth Amendment, I conclude that substantive
criminal law is inherent into the U.S. Constitution. In the general context,
constitutionalizing substantive criminal law means raising the fundamental
principles of substantive criminal law to the constitutional level, thus
granting the judiciary the power to declare a particular criminal provision,
for example, void, if it stands in contradiction with a fundamental
principle of substantive criminal law.
At the outset, the Article targets one of the long-standing American
enigmas concerning the constitutionality of a criminal prohibition against
desecrating the American flag, thus seeking to preserve so-called
national unity. However, in substance, this Article has been coping with
a different and more substantial problem. The flag enigma has been
provided here as a classic example where substantive criminal law and
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constitutional law intersect. However, the American jurisdiction, like
comparative jurisdictions in these regards, has limited its analysis solely
in accordance with the classic grounds of constitutionalism. Correctly,
courts of such jurisdictions have declared such criminalization to be
unconstitutional. However, this has been done merely on the premise
that if desecrating the flag is protected by the constitution as a symbolic
speech, it would only be unconstitutional to criminalize such action.
But what sense does it make to challenge the constitutionality of the
criminal prohibition against flag desecration, if desecrating the flag
cannot be a crime in the first place? The question whether conduct can
be made a crime logically precedes the question whether commission of
that crime is under certain circumstances protected as free speech.
Furthermore, in the American context in particular, the Court fails to
address the case of a person who physically destroys a flag without
intending to communicate any message.
The Article suggests a genuine distinction between crime and constitutional
crime. In any constitutional democracy, for the legislature to validly
classify conduct as a crime, the fundamental principles of criminal law
theory must be met, thus empowering courts to strike down criminal
laws when they fail the following tests: (1) whether the particular
criminal prohibition befits the values of constitutional democracy;
(2) whether the prohibition serves a proper purpose; and (3) whether the
criminalization is proportionate. As for the flag enigma, it has been the
view in this Article that flag desecration may not be made a crime, for it
stands in contrast with the fundamental principles of substantive criminal
law. Even if it survives the serious obstacles posed by these fundamental
principles, such criminalization still may not be constitutionally justified,
for it fails to meet every step of the above-mentioned three tests, and
therefore such criminalization may not prevail.
Eventually, what underlines this Article is an attempt to establish some
order, logic, coherency, and methodology. "Criminalization" is not an
open buffet of pick and choose; the legislature is not free to criminalize
any conduct arbitrarily. Any criminalization ought to be examined, first
and foremost, in light of the fundamental principles of criminal law,
which hold a constitutional status.
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VIII. EPILOGUE
If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of
the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one
person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.
236
Democracy is not solely a system of rights, but also a system of
wrongs. A constitution is a regime of rights and balances, but it is not a
system of wrongs. It is for theory to draw the line between right and
wrong, and it is for the constitution to draw the line between undesirable
behavior and punishable wrong. The U.S. Supreme Court can be proud
of a constitutional legacy on the theory of free expression, but not so as
to substantive criminal law. The Court has consistently shown reluctance to
tangle with substantive criminal law.
A glimpse into comparative studies, among them Germany, Canada,
Israel, and the European Court of Human Rights, leaves no doubt as to
the great influence of American constitutional theory on free speech.
American law is one of the rare legal systems in which the flag enigma
has received intensive constitutional legal treatment; in other jurisdictions,
this issue has been almost untouched. When the time comes, I believe
that comparative jurisdictions will follow the American ultimate
approach, thereby letting the free expression theory prevail. However, I
doubt that comparative jurisdictions will adopt the same methodology.
Comparative studies provide a wealth of developed theories of criminal
law, especially in Germany, where substantive criminal law is a genuine
cell of the constitutional body of scrutiny. I have found comparative law
to be of great assistance in realizing the role that constitutional law plays
in scrutinizing substantive criminal law, which represents a mechanism
of limiting and infringing rights. Comparative studies, especially of
Canada and Israel, were of great help in understanding the non-absolute
nature of constitutional rights, as well as in realizing the sensitive balance
236. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 14 (1946); see also 4 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW:
HISTORY, SOURCES. PRINCIPLES 1847 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans.,
1994): "There is probably no more apt and incisive formulation of the principle of
freedom of expression and the value of opinion ... than the formulation used by the
Sages with regard to the differences of opinion between the schools of Shammai and
Hillel, namely that 'both are the words of the living God' TB Eruvin 13b; TJ Berakhot 1:
4, 9b (1:7, 3b); TJ Yevamot 1:6, 9a (1:6, 3b)."
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that constitutional law may strike between fundamental constitutional
rights and other important social interests.
I am aware of the large dispute, in the American context, over the
legitimacy of discussing comparative law. However, the recent decade
has proved that different legal systems have encountered similar legal
problems, e.g., the fight against terrorism, the meaning of self-defense,
the meaning of crime, the applicability of constitutional rights to non-
citizens, hate speech, and political speech. In this context, comparative
studies become of great importance, especially because many of the
fundamental constitutional principles of democracy are common to
democratic states. Of course, comparative law should be approached
cautiously, at least because of the unique sensitivity of every legal
system, and therefore it is patently obvious that the final decision must
always be local. Nonetheless, "[t]he benefit of comparative law is in
expanding judicial thinking about the possible arguments, legal trends,
and decision-making structure available." '237
In this article, I sought to address one of the long-standing legal
problems of American legal thought. I do not believe that Eichman was
the end of the story, but only the end of the beginning. I do see a
constitutional amendment that protects the physical integrity of the flag
in the future, and consequently petitions against the constitutionality of
such amendment. It will then be interesting to see how the U.S. Supreme
Court reacts. For this possible challenge facing the core problem, I was
not willing to limit my discussion to the specific issue of flag desecration.
Rather, I sought to delineate a whole theory on the constitutional meaning
of criminal wrongdoing. My theory has a universal appeal, and does not
limit itself to a specific jurisdiction.
Criminal law punishes wrongful actions but not wrongful opinions.
Punishing flag desecration because of the arguably national status of the
flag is nothing but punishing opinions; it is not about the act of
desecration but rather about the flag, namely, about the opinion. It
might be true that the flag has its own self. Nevertheless, the flag is not
solely a medium; there are occasions, and this was the case for the Flag
Protection Act, where the flag is a speech. To understand the content of
this speech, the distinction between statehood and nationhood can be of
great help. I have addressed this distinction elsewhere, suggesting that
nationhood refers to ordinary people who may or may not have a state;
something stronger than a state binds the people together. 238 The nation
bears the factors that constitute each individual, the language, the
history, the culture, and the bond between geography and self, and it is
237. BARAK, supra note 45. at 198.
238. Wattad, supra note 144, at 208-09.
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what people feel part of, rather than merely belong to. 23 9 The nation acts
in history, achieving greatness and committing crimes, for its glory as
well as its shame. Getting a grip on this distinction has brought me to
understand that though all states as entities have flags, the flag is still a
concept of nationhood. This is the Shakespearian notion of brotherhood.240
Unlike the nation, the state is what people belong to, but not necessarily
what they feel part of If the people are part of the nation, it follows that
the nation comes first, and thus legitimizes the establishment of the state.
Unlike "nation," the state is timeless; it does not exist in time. State is
about organization of power; it is a political entity.
A state is not a synonym for a nation. A person may belong to the
state yet not the nation. Being part of the state means being a citizen of
the state, but not necessarily a national. Of course, one may belong, at
the same time, both to the nation and to the state, such as being a Jew
and an Israeli. The government represents the state, which includes
citizens who are part of the nation and citizens who are not part of the
nation. If the flag is a mirror-image of the "national unity," it follows
that the flag and the government represent one common side of the state,
namely, those citizens who are part of the nation as well. However, the
government also represents those who are citizens but not part of the
nation. In preserving the physical integrity of the flag, the integrity of
the nation is preserved, not the integrity of those who do not belong to
the nation, but the citizens of the state.
The existence of the flag is a fact, but the flag itself is an opinion.
Facts shall not be denied, but opinions per se are disputable. This is
what Voltaire viewed as: "I may not agree with what you say, but I will
defend to the death your right to say it."'24 1 There are many things we, as
a community, may not like, but not everything we do not like shall be
criminalized and punished. Constitutional democracy bears some unique
features. Constitutional democracy is not merely a representative system,
it is not only the voice of the majority, and it is not solely the voice of
the legislature. Constitutional democracy is a balancing system, it is the
voice of the majority but also the guard for minorities and their human
239. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, ROMANTICS AT WAR: GLORY AND GUILT IN THE AGE OF
TERRORISM xiii (2002).
240. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V (1999). Act IV.3. lines 60 63.
241. See DAVID SHAGER, & ELIZABETH FROST, THE QUOTABLE LAWYER 285
(1988). It is commonly attributed to Voltaire. but actually it was written by his
biographer, Evelyn Beatrice Hall, writing as S. G. Tallentyre in 1906.
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rights, and it is the voice of the legislature only when it enacts laws in
accordance with the fundamental highest principles of the Law, namely,
justice, reasonableness, and proportionality. Constitutional democracy is
not a melting democracy, so-called defensive democracy, but still it is
not a suicide pact.242 Constitutional democracy is not a total system of
deprivation, suppression, and criminal punishment, but a system of
tolerance as once patiently stated by Aharon Barak:
Democracy is based on tolerance ... Indeed, tolerance constitutes both an end
and a means. It constitutes a social goal in itself, which every democratic
society should aspire to realize. It serves as a means and a tool for balancing
between other social goals and reconciling them, in cases where they conflict
with one another.
243
242. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36 (1949) (Jackson. J.. dissenting).
243. BARAK, supra note 45, at 63-64.
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